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11. INTRODUCTION
"The Commission considers that in general takeover bids can be regarded as 
a positive factor which provides a mechanism for the market to select the 
most competitive firms and could stimulate the process of reorganization 
of European companies which is indispensable in order to face up interna­
tional competition*4.
The above statement,1 indicating a liberal stance towards 
takeovers, is perhaps not altogether justified in the case of 
cross-border takeovers in the Communities. This thesis will 
contend that certain extra regulation with regard to the institu­
tional design of the prospective procedural arrangement of
takeover bids in the EC might be required if the reorganization\
goal is to be pursued.
Although in 1974 the Commission of the EC had already appointed 
Professor Pennington to prepare a draft of (an eventual Proposal 
for a Council Directive on the Regulation of Takeover Bids in the 
EC, no action whatsoever was taken in this respect for several 
years, until the issue reappeared in the White Paper m  1985. 
The final version of the EC Takeover bid Proposal was only adopted 
by the Commission on 22 December 1988.4 The EC Proposal does
1. INFORMATION MEMO, "Takeover Bids, Clear rules for the single market", 
Spokesman's Service, Commission of the EC, Brussels, 22 December 1988, p. 2;
2. PENNINGTON, Report relating to takeover bids and other bids,
Commission of the EC, XI/56/74, Brussels (Pennington Report);
3. COMMISSION OF THE EC, "Completing the Internal Market" (The White
Paper), COM (85) 310, Brussels (1986), Annex p. 29;
4. PROPOSAL for a Thirtheenth Council Directive on Company Law concerning
takeover and other general bids, C0M(88) 823 final, OJ No. C 65/8, Brussels
(1989);

2not explicitly distinguish between friendly and unfriendly take­
overs.5 It has been argued that European corporate reality does 
not face unfriendly takeover attempts.6 The Takeover bid Propo­
sal offers a broad definition of takeover bids: friendly offers 
are also included.7 As capital movements are gradually being 
liberalized, it is likely that the number of takeover bids is 
going to increase.8
5. An unfriendly takeover can come off against the wiivl of the management
of the target corporation. The bidder tries to acquire a controlling
interest by addressing all individual shareholders to tender their securi­
ties in the corporation. Ousting of management is one of the most probable 
explanations for takeover bids, see EASTERBRQOK, FISCHEL, "The Proper Role 
of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer'1, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 
1161 (1981). The market of corporate control can best be viewed as a
major component of the managerial labour market, see MANNE, "Mergers and the 
market for corporate control", 73 J. Pol. Econ! 110 (1965) The capital
market thus serves as a corrector, when internal mechanisms break down, the
premium that is being offered to the target's shareholders over the market
price is what persuades them to tender. See JENSEN, RUBACK, "The Market for
Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence", 11 Journ. of Financ. Econ.
5 (1983); BEBCHUCK, "The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers", 95 
Harv. L. Rev. 1028 (1982); GILSON, Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisit­
ions, Mineóla NY (1986);
6. In particular German authors, see e.g. OTTO, "Übernahmeversuche be i 
Aktiengesellschaften und Strategien der Abwehr", 29 DB Beilage 12 (1968); 
Otto claims that these attempts were practically unknown in Belgium and the 
Federal Republic of Germany until de Benedetti launched his bid for 
la Genérale; See also PELTZER, "Hostile Takeovers in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland?", 10 ZIP 69 (1989), especially p. 72; Cf. however, Wall Street 
Journal 22/5/89, on Veba's hostile., quest for Feldmuehle conceding that 
unfriendly takeovers are possible irT the FRG under certain conditions; For 
Italy see VIGLIANO, "Hostile Takeovers in Italy", 7 Int’l. Fin. L. Rev. 11 
(1988);
7. See point 9., TAKEOVER BID PROPOSAL, supra note 4, p. 4; Although this
conclusion does not follow from the defintion offered there as such, it can 
be deduced from e.g. Art. 14 or Art. 10 (1) (m);
8. See INFORMATION MEMO, supra note 1, p. 1? GARCIA-ECOCHEAGA, BARSUTO, 
GONZALES ESTEBANr "Fusiones y Adquisiciones I", 43 Bol. Estud. Econ. 227 
(1988), p. 232;

3Given the increase of the number of takeover bids the need for 
harmonization becomes apparent. Harmonization as such within the 
Communities of takeover bids will be difficult, as practice and 
regulation vary largely between the Member States. For example, 
practice in the FRG is heavily influenced by its corporate struc­
ture, with the two-tier board, the group of companies structures, 
the relatively small number of publicly held corporations and the 
role of banks in financing the corporation.9 In the UK, on the 
other hand, takeover bids appear rather frequently, owing to a 
very open securities market and a widespread corporate ownership. 
Although these conditions are true for the Netherlands as well, 
unfriendly takeover bids are seldom launched there, owing to the 
heavily armed corporations,10 which engage in several defensive
techniques at a time.11 Regulation of the phenomenon is done inI
9. See PELTZER, supra note 6; GRUSON, MEILICKE, "The New Co-Determination 
Law in Germany", 32 Bus. Law. 571 (1977) , pp. 577-580;
10. The Dutch Civil Code actually contains several provisions allowing
certain defensive measures, e.g. Art. 82 jo. 87 Book 2, Dutch Civil Code?
11. Defensive tactics are methods used by corporations to thwart uncalled
for takeover bids. There is a whole range of these tactics, and constantly 
new ones are being invented and implemented. See ARANOW, EINHORN, Develop­
ments in Tender Offers for Corporate Control, New York (1977) pp. 193-206; 
Distinction should be made with ex ante tactics, usually of a more general 
nature and implemented with shareholders' approval; these make the potential 
launching of a bid less attractive; ex post tactics are aimed at a specific 
bidder at the time of a bid; There is a load of literature assessing these 
tactics, see e.g. GORDON, ‘'Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the 
Problem of Shareholder Choice", 76 Calif. L. Rev. 3 (1988); HONEE, "Be- 
scherraingsconstructies", 66 NV 154 (1988); DAWSON, PENCE, STONE, "Poison
Pills Defensive Measures", 42 Bus. Law. 423 (1987); GORDON, KORNHAUSER,
"Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two Models", 96 Yale L. J. 295
(1986); BRADLEY, ROSENZWEIG, "Defensive Stock Repurchases", 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 1377 (1986), to name but a few...

4various ways: statutory rules, such as in France and Spain,
voluntary codes of conduct, such as in the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, which has a very sophisticated system of self­
regulation, or monitoring in practice, such as in Belgium.12 By 
and large, the rules laid down in the various regulatory instru­
ments aim at ensuring market transparency and fair dealing, and 
equal treatment of the involved parties. These are also the basic 
aims of the EC proposal, which tries to lay down a minimum stan­
dard .
Next to disclosure and equal treatment matters, another feature 
of takeovers is the possible anti-competitive effects they might
have. As the Commission clearly states, this is a question of
iCompetition Policy, and not to be regulated in a Takeover bid 
Directive.13 This question will mostly be left aside in thisI
thesis, although reference to merger control at times might prove 
necessary.
There is however one question that is not being regulated in the 
Takeover bid proposal, but one that could require some regulatory 
action, as it is^possibly relevant. t~n t-he--fur.ther.ing process of 
European Integration^_\The case of national interests in the event
of a so-called cross-border unfriendly takeover attempt. The
12. See PENNINGTON, supra note 2, pp. 5-8;
13. See INFORMATION MEMO, supra note 1, p. 1; PENNINGTON, supra note 2, In­
troduction p. Ill;

5problem is two-fold: First, with the rise of cross-border bids,
an equal rise of nationalistic popular opposition is likely to 
14come about; although European Integration is the talk of the 
day, business cultures are still far apart in the Member States, 
so that investment by certain other Member States is still looked 
upon with suspicion. Second, no clear (legal) definition exists 
of national interests, with regard to corporate takeovers. Natio­
nal interests could serve as an additional (while unclear and 
vague) instrument to stop an unfriendly (cross-border) takeover 
bid. However, certain issues may well be raised at the event of a 
takeover bid originating abroad which are of a more general con­
cern; it is not altogether certain which constituent could invoke 
such an interest legitimately; whether this should be for example 
a corporate actor or a regulator. IThis thesis will deal with national interest issues in the 
context of takeovers. The idea is that a monitoring agency on the 
Community level would have to be instated, in order to review 
objectively, whether national interests may be invoked legitimate­
ly in certain unfriendly bid battles. Although the same conten­
tion might hold for friendly offers, this thesis is focused on the 
unfriendly bids, since it is more likely that in such cases an
14, E.g. the contention "What's good for General Motors is good for 
America” , The Economist, 21-27 February 1988? :"The national interest is 
almost always a bad argument for stopping takeovers"; See also GLASZ, "Halen 
Beschermingsconstructies 1992 ?", T W S  163 (1988),p. 167, who warns us about 
emerging nationalism with regard to foreign takeover attempts, regardless of 
the bidder's country of origin (which then includes inter Community bids);-

6unreal use of the argument will be made. However, before the 
question of legitimacy of the national interest can be dealt with 
it is useful to make a statement regarding the identity of the 
appropriate regulator to define such an interest.
The practice and regulation in the United States is very rele­
vant for our purposes: not only does American literature deal 
extensively with takeovers and related matters, but there is also 
an interesting feature to be observed, which is the opposite of 
what is happening in the EC: regulation is being carried out more
\ *! Cand more on a state level, instead of on the federal level.^ 
Which are the differences in attitudes towards the regulation of 
takeover bids in the EC in comparison with the US?
!In chapter 2, an attempt will be made to point out what could 
constitute a national interest. To illustrate the issue in the 
takeover context, this part will contain a case where a Belgian
15. See: BUXBAUM, H0PT, "Legal Harmonization and the Business Enterprise," 
in: CAPPELLETTI, SECCOMBE, WEILER EDS., Integration Through Law, Vol. 4
Berlin/New York (1988), p. 130: '*[••• ]not only are recent state efforts to
participate in regulation of hostile;^ tender offers even closer to the
traditional state corporation law agenda, .but by drawing hostile fire from 
federal Supremacy Clause and Commerce Clause preemption concepts they have 
drawn this entire area of state securities regulation into the vortex of the 
division of powers in a federal system"; Although the EC are by no means 
considered here as a federal analogy of the US, it is interesting to note 
what kinds of conclusions can be drawn from this fact. Is the Commission of 
the EC trying to arrogate to itself regulatory powers that should be left to 
the Member States? Is regulation required to ensure that capital movements 
are effectively liberalized?

7Court approved of actions by a corporation to thwart an unfriendly 
cross-border bid. The corporation's course of action was partly 
justified by the Court on the ground that a legitimate national 
interest was at stake.
In chapter 3, some comments will be offered regarding the 
regulation of takeover bids in the EC and certain Member States, 
in particular the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. How (if at 
all) are national interests protected?
Chapter 4 will offer a view into the regulation of takeover bids 
in the United States. Next to the fact that there simply exists a 
good deal of regulation in this field in the United States, the 
description of the rules in the US is relevant for this thesis in
}order to see, whether a federal approach to the regulation of
i
takeovers in the EC is equally justified.
/Finally, chapter 5 will combine the conclusions to be drawn from 
chapters 3 and 4, and refer to the relevance of a federal ap­
proach. It will also contain a suggestion for further regulation.

82. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND TAKEOVER BIDS
2.1. Transnational corporations and regulations
Cross-border bids occur more and more often in the interdepen­
dent system of transnational corporations. There is no agreed 
definition as to what would constitute a transnational corpora­
tion.16 According to Grewlich, there is no basic difference 
between the notions of J 'multinationals ' \and ■ transnationals ' ."V7 
The word transnational better conveys the idea that enterprises 
under this classification operate from their home bases across}national borders. Corporate integration can be seen as the inter­
national integration of activities by and within transnationalIenterprises.
One reason for increasing takeover activity is the increasing
18globalization of world markets. Because of this, activities
16. See e.g. UNITED NATIONS, Centre on Transnational Corporations, Survey
of Research on Transnational Corporations, New York (1977); the OECD
refrains from defining the* MNE: OECD, Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, Paris (1986); According to Dunning, Transnational Corporation 
is the UN nomenclature for MNE's, DUNNING, "Multinational Enterprises in the 
1970's: An Economist's Overview of Trends, Theories and Policies", in: HOPT 
ED., European Merger Control, Berlin/New York (1982), p. 16;
17. GREWLICH, Transnational Enterprises in a New International System, 
Alphen a/d Rijn (1980), p. 35;
18. For extensive research on the several possible motives for (unfriendly) 
takeovers, see: JENSEN, "Takeover controversy: analysis and evidence", pp. 
314-357; ROLL, "Empirical Evidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder 
(Footnote continues on next page)

9such as efficient reallocation of a corporation's assets on the
19 20international plane, penetration of a foreign market, owing 
to the saturation of merger possibilities on the national market 
resulting from high levels of concentration, or the securing of a 
market position in an emerging trade bloc,; will lead to cross- 
border takeover bids.
Although deregulation is perceived as another reason for in-
21creased takeover activity , as regards national interests, the 
desire for regulation -or at least some form of legal protection- 
emerges. There are various approaches to regulation and the 
question is highly entangled with economic theory. The laissez-
faire approach finds a fundamentally competitive market economy
iwhere state intervention is undesirable; in a cost-benefit ana-
i
lysis on the other hand, the approach will vary, as certain marketItransactions (takeovers) may result in both welfare gains and
(Footnote continued from previous page)
Wealth" , pp. 241-253, both in: COFFEE, LÖWENSTEIN, ROSE-ACKERMAN EDS.,
Knights, Raiders and Targets: The Impact of the Hostile Takeover, New York
(1988); I
19. MULDCJR, Probl. Econ*, 14/9/88, p. 22 : "L'acquisition d ' enterpr ises 
étrangères ou autochtones n'est pas une dépense inutile des ressources 
internes d'un pays; c'est au contraire un moyen de réallocation productive 
des actifs de sociétés sur le plan international”;
20. SÜNNER, "Takeovers, made in the USA", 32 AG 276 (1987), "mit denen das 
Eindringen in fremde Märkte unternommen werden soll oder der auch nur dazu 
dienen soll, zyklische Schwankungen des eigenen Unternehmens auszugleichen 
und die Unternehmensergebnisse zu verstetigen";
21. See OECD, Compétition in OECD Countries 1986-1987, Paris (1988), p. 2; 
Also JENSEN, supra note 18, pp. 317-318, who offers emprical evidence as to 
this rise, in certain industrial sectors, e.g. oil & gas;

10
losses.
Two main theories of economic regulation may be distinguished:
1) the 'public interest1 theory, which holds that regulation is
supplied in response to the demand of the public for correction of
inefficient or inequitable market prices, and 2) the 'capture'
theory, which holds that regulation is supplied in response to the
demands of interest groups struggling among themselves to maximize
the income of the members.23 Both theories, as they are not
necessarily mutually exclusive, play a large role in the national
2 4interest question. The public interest theory will be dealt 
with more extensively below.25 The capture theory, although it 
will not be referred to any further as such, serves as a starting 
point for the fourth chapter on the US.
22
<In the takeovers field, we find some sort of regulation in three 
areas: first, where, information is perceived as inadequate and
22. ROWLEY, "Antitrust and Economic Efficiency", in: OGUS, VELJANOVSKI,
CENTO, Readings in the Economics of Law and Regulation, Oxford (1984), p. 
222f f; |
23. POSNER, "Theories of Economic Regulation”, in: OGUS, VELJANOVSKI, CENTO
, ibid. p. 240ff; Also: STIGLER, "The Theory of Economic Regulation", 2 
Bell J. of Econ. 3 (1971), who insists that economic regulation serves the 
private interests of politically effective groups? PELTZMAN, "Toward a More 
General Theory of Regulation", 19 J, of L. & Econ, 211 (1976 ) , in
particular the Comment, HIRSCHLEIFER, id., p. 241: regulators themselves
constitute an interest group and there is competition between different
regulatory agencies; This clarifies why takeover regulation comes from so 
many different sources...
24. This will be seen more clearly when we deal with the economic theory of 
federalism, which could fit under both headings, see infra pp. 90ff;
25. See infra para* 4.4.;

11
the process as touching upon public objectives: rules raising the 
cost of an acquisition and shifting risks upon the bidder, second, 
where the process is perceived as involving wealth transfers: 
rules defining the circumstances under which target management may 
engage in transactions/behavior to defeat an unfriendly takeover 
attempt. The sources at which these rules can be found, are 
mainly Securities Regulation, general Corporation laws and, 
particularly in the US-, judicial interpretations of fiduciary 
standards applicable to decisions of corporate managers.
The third group, though some overlap might occur, is largely 
disregarded by both regulators and academics: where the process is 
perceived as having possible disruptive effects on national inter­
ests: rules aimed at prohibiting or deterring foreign acquis-
tions.
/
2,2. Protecting National Interests
Various instruments may be employed for this purpose:
- prohibition, or required authorization by law; such a law would 
have to: 1) prevent the possibility of bids by a foreign com-

12
26 27party, 2) prevent foreign ownership of national corporations,
3) limit foreign holdings of voting rights to a certain thres-
2 8hold, or 4) require administrative authorization in certain 
29cases;
If the law does not expressly state prohibitions or requirements 
for foreign holdings, c.q, ownership, there is always the pos­
sibility that the corporation itself could include certain:
- prescriptions or prohibitions in its articles of association, 
these could be: 1) aimed directly at foreigners,30 or 2) not
26. This e.g. the case in Sweden, see inter alia: ’Bassett plays the
Rowntree takeover tune", FT 4-5/2/89, p. 9;
27. e.g. in France; in Switzerland the "Lex Friedrich", which limits
foreigners’ rights to buy property in Switzerland. This would amount to 
preventing a foreigner from buying a Swiss corporation which has more than 
half of its assets in real estate, see: "Swiss bid code riddled with
contradictions", FT 6/5/88; in Mexico, the former^ Foreign Investment Law 
1973, which set a limit of 49 % foreign ownership of all companies
established in Mexico;
28. again Switzerland, albeit in this case the provision is not
specifically appilcable to foreigners, but also to nationals;
29. e.g. in the US (see also infra pp. ?), the so-called Exon-Florio
provision; conversely in Mexico, where the Foreign Investment Law
established a national commission of foreign investments that had the
authority to allow 100 % foreign ownership, where the investment was
determined to be in the national interest; Also: GARCIA-ECOCHEAGO, BARSUTO,
GONZALES-ESTEBAN, supra note 8, p. 235 table 5, which provides a list of 
limitations in the law and other structural limitations against foreign 
takeovers in several countries;, including some EEC; The authors found no 
direct limitations in the laws of Spain, Italy and the Netherlands. With 
regard to the FRG and the UK the Merger Control authorities are mentioned. 
Only French law used to have a direct:' prohibition with regard to foreign
acquisitions of more than 20 %, which now only extends to non-EEC countries. 
Political resistance is identified as the major structural limitation;
30. The provision e.g., that registered shares may only be kept by
nationals (applied by Nestle, FT 6/5/88, the holding of golden shares by the 
government, see infra p. 53, or, -more specifically related to a possible 
motive for takeovers: the market for corporate control-, the provision that 
(Footnote continues on next page)
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directly aimed at foreigners, because equally applicable to na­
tionals; 31
It is more difficult to come up with a workable definition of 
what could possibly constitute a national interest. One attempt 
to define those interests presents two sides: there is a national
concern, where there are anti-competitive effects (as said in the 
introduction, we will leave this mostly aside in this thesis), and 
where there are costs to be borne by the community as a whole, 
rather than by the merged firm. Here, one should think specifi­
cally of regional labor redundancies, arising after a takeover.32
It still remains a vague concept. The group mentioned above 
will be referred to hereafter as 'stakes': they include various
different interests at a national (federal) level, such as protec-
/tion of the national economy, including national employment, or 
objectives of industrial policy; the argument for instance, that
(Footnote continued from previous page)
members of the Board of Directors shall be nationals of the state of 
incorporation (although it is not sure whether they would see to the actual 
protection of national interests);
31. This supposedly would be the explanation for the extensive system of 
defensive measures in the Netherlands, originally established to prevent an 
unfriendly takeover by a foreign party, see e.g. Rapport van de Commissie 
Beschermingsconstructies, aan het Bestuur van de Vereniging voor de Effect- 
enhandel, Amsterdam (1987); maintaining the national interest came first, it 
is argued;
32. See: WEINBERG, BLANK, on Takeovers and Mergers, 4th ed., London (1979), 
pp. 8-12;

14
banks should not be owned by foreigners because they are instru­
ments of national monetary policy. Stakes may vary largely, 
however, nor is it entirely clear what would be the direct effect 
thereupon of a takeover. Stakeholders may vary as well: they
could be employees of the target, who are in a weak bargaining 
position at the time of a takeover.
Another reference to national interests, although in this con­
text we should think more of a European interest, is to be found 
in a statement of the Commission of the EC of 22 March 1988 (con­
cerning concentration control):33
"As progress is made towards achieving the unified single market, national 
instruments (of concentration control) would not only prove to be 
increasingly ineffective: there would also be a damaging risk to the
internal market if they were used to favour national champions rather than 
the interests of the Community as a whole."
If the Commission has its reservations as to the favoring of 
national champions in the context of concentration control, it 
should probably have the same fears in the field of takeover bids. 
This is because, as has been said before, albeit not always lead­
ing to distorting concentrations, an attempt to stop a merger at 
the time of such a bid might be equally motivated by the will to
favor a national champion.( An example that springs to mind first,i
and which we will treat below 3, is the Belgian Société Générale. 
Another example could be a national 'flag-state carrier' airline
33. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, amended proposal for a Council Regulation on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings, COM(88) 97 final, Brus­
sels (1988), p. 4; r .
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company, the shares of which are publicly held for more than 50 
34%. A potential takeover of such a champion might give rise to 
considerable popular opposition, not only where a foreseeable
effect on the national economy will be perceived (stake), but even
because the champion is being seen as having a symbolic value to
the nation in which it is incorporated.35
Probably the least debatable national interest, given the cur­
rent state of international affairs, is where the target is of 
strategic interest to the country of incorporation. A takeover of 
such a target could definitely impair national security.36 This
argument is employed in American federal anti-takeover legisla- 
37tion, but has also been advanced recently in the EC, by the
/
British Plessey Corp., when confronted with an unfriendly takeover
3 8bid by GEC (British/American) and Siemens (German). We have
/now identified at least three groups of national interests in 
relation to unfriendly cross-border takeovers: stakes, symbolic.
34. E.g. British Airways, after its privatisation in 1988; See: The
Economist, (4-10/2/89), p. 18; Another example: the contention: "What's
good for General Motors is good for America","The national interest is 
almost always a bad argument for stopping takeovers1’, The Economist, (21- 
27/2/89);
35. MULDUR,supra note 19, p. 21, speaks in this context of the fear of loss 
of the national identity;
36. Id.; Muldur has identified two groups of national interests: "Symboles 
et Stratégiques”; As to strategic interests, see also: The Economist (21- 
27/2/38), p# 19-
37. See infra p. 67;
38. See: FT (9/1/89), p. 1: "Raising the prospect of a highly politicised 
struggle over the issue of British high technology and defence assets 
falling into foreign hands." It must be added here, that Plessey has not 
left any means unemployed, to try to stop the takeover;
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and strategic. Maintaining a competitive national market is a 
possible fourth group, but this group will be left aside in this 
thesis.
On a Community level, only indirect reference is made to na­
tional interests. The Treaty of Rome contains both prohibitions
on discrimination on nationality grounds, such as Article 7,39
Article 52,40 relating to the freedom of establishment, or Ar­
ticle 67,41 relating to free movement of capital. However, the 
Treaty also contains certain provisions that point at the pos­
sibility to defend national interests: Art. 5642 , whereas a
39. Art. 7 EEC reads as follows: "Within the sàope of application of this
Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, 
any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. The
Council may, on a proposal from the Commission and (in cooperation with the 
European Parliament], adopt, by a qualified majority, rules designed to
prohibit such discrimination."
40. The relevant part of Art. 52 reads: "Within the framework of the
provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of 
nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall
be abolished by progressive stages in the course of the transitional period. 
Such abolition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting up of 
agencies, branches, or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State 
established in the terrirory of any Member State." (...)
41. Art. 67 : "1. During the transitional period and to the extent
necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the common market, Member
States shall progressively abolish"between themselves all restrictions on
the movement of capital belonging to persons resident in Member States and
any discrimination based on the nationality or on the place of residence of
the parties or on the place where such capital is invested. (...)"
4 2 The relevant part goes: "1. the provisions of this Chapter and measures 
taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of provi­
sions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for
special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health. (...)"
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possibility to defend security interests may follow from Art. 223 
(1) (b).43
A definition of national interests, in the case of an attempted 
foreign takeover could be: concerns that transcend the corpora­
tion which is the target of an unfriendly cross-border bid. The 
question then arises who is the best decisionmaker on such na­
tional interests? A line must then be drawn between identifying 
which interests concern a larger entity than the corporation 
(define the national interest), and establishing which actor can 
invoke legitimately such an interest against the foreign bidder. 
The whole issue seems to be closely intertwined with theories of 
sovereignty of states. Does the interest at stake concern the 
nation? We will investigate this below on the basis of the econo­
mic theory of federalism. The next paragraph, however, serves to 
illustrate 1. what is perceived as an example of a national inter­
est (as set out above) in one of the EC Member States and 2. why 
establishing a supra-national decisionmaker on legitimacy of an 
invoked national interest is required.
43. Art. 223 (1) (b): "1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not prelude 
the application of the following rules:
(...)
(b) Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for 
the protection of the essential interests of its security which are
connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war
material; such measures shall not, however, adversely affect the conditions 
of competition in the common market regarding products which are not
intended for specifically military purposes. (...)"
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2«3. Tender is the Knight: De Benedetti and La Société Générale
The difficulty in assessing the importance of this case lies in 
the fact that the actual rationale for wanting to stop the De 
Benedetti takeover was surrounded by a whole spectrum of corporate 
tactics to thwart the bid. The underlying argument, however, was 
made clear by the Press: that la Générale should remain in Belgian
44hands.
The facts, briefly stated, are as follows: on January 17, 1988, 
the French Cerus corporation (held by De Benedetti), having ac­
quired an 18 % stake on and outside of the stock exchange, launch-(ed a takeover bid for La Générale. The same day, this was offi­
cially communicated to the Commission Bancaire, a Belgian takeover 
monitoring agency. In the night of 17/18 January, the Société 
Générale increased its capital, by issuing authorized capital.45 
This poison pill, if sufficiently subscribed to, would signifi­
cantly diminish De Benedetti's voting stake. On January 18, Cerus 
filed a petition to obtain an injunction prohibiting this capital 
augmentation. Arguing that the augmentation had already taken
44. See inter alia: FT: 19/1/88, 19/2/88, 20/2/88, 17/3/88, 25/4/88; The
Economist, 23/1/88, quoting Eyskens that la Générale was a lever of
(Belgian) Economic policy;
45. See also: PHILLIPS, "The Battle for la Générale", , Inst. inv. 94 
(1988);
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place the previous night, Cerus filed a second unilateral peti­
tion, on the 19th, to block the new stock held by Sodecom, a 
subsidiary of La Générale, which had subscribed to the augmenta­
tion. The -Commercial Chamber of the Brussels Court held, in the 
first of two rulings, that such augmentation was unacceptable, and 
suspended the rights attached to the new shares in the second.46 
Two other rulings were delivered, on February 9 and 18, 1988.47
The decisions were appealed, and on March 1, 1988, the Cour 
d'Appel delivered a decree establishing that systematic stock 
exchange purchases are not the same as a takeover bid, and issued 
the following ruling as to the means used by La Générale, to fend
4 8off Cerus/De Benedetti:
1. the use of authorized capital, combined with augmentationi
thereof may be legitimate when taking into account corporate
/interests; 2. abolition of preferential shareholders1 rights is 
justified to maintain a widespread shareholders’ group; 3. newly 
created titles may be subscribed by a subsidiary, if the autonomy
46* Ordonnances du Tribunal de Commerce: Comm. Bruxelles, 19 janvier
1988, 21 RDC/TBH 512 (1988),| p. 535; Comm. Bruxelles, 20 janvier 1988, 21 
RDC/TBH 512 (1988), p. 538;
47. Comm. Bruxelles, 9 février 1988, 21 RDC/TBH 512 (1988), p. 540; Comm.
Bruxelles, 18 février 1988, 21 RDC/TBÇ-512 (1988), note, p. 566, relating to 
capital augmentation of shares of subsidiaries of La Générale; The 
Commercial Chamber acknowledged the role of these industrial corporations in 
defending national interests: "(...) rappelons-le, sont avant tout des
sociétés industrielles et de service avant d'etre des "holdings", de 
préparer l'échéance 1992, de veiller au maintien de l'emploi et de maintenir 
un secteur énérgetique (...) exemplaire, vital pour notre économie 
nationale." (p. 567);
48. Arrêt de la Cour d'Appel, 1 mars 1988, 21 RDC/TBH 512 (1988), pp. 512- 
534;
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of that subsidiary is not fictitious and if the subsidiary is not 
being employed against the law; 4. procedural flaws either in the 
augmentation of capital decision, or the determination of that 
augmentation, do not necessarily make those decisions null and 
void, where a regularization is thinkable. ■
This appeal decision thus authorized ex post all measures taken 
by La Générale to keep De Benedetti from control, making his 
experiment in the nascent world of continental unfriendly take­
overs a rather expensive experience.
This case demonstrated the necessity for a set of clear rules in 
the field of takeovers; and it propelled the European Parliament
49to urge the Commission finally to come with its proposal.
i
1
The most interesting aspect of this case for our purposes
• /however, is the following consideration presented by the Cour 
d*Appel:50
"Rien n'empeche en outre le conseil de tenir compte de la politique
industrielle de la Belgique et de l'emploi: la loyauté confédérale et les 
dispositions de l'Acte Unique (Dutch text: "EEG-verdrag = Treaty of Rome") 
n'imposent pas, de lege lata, au conseil de s'abstenir de telles
considerations (Dutch text: "nationale belangen = national interests")
This part of the decision was delivered in response to an argu­
ment by a jointly interested party, de Jode.51 The argument in
49* JOINT RESOLUTION, on takeover bids by the European Parliament, OJ 68/76
(1988);
50. See Comm. Bruxelles, 21 RDC/TRH 512 (1988), p. 513?
51. Ibid., pp. 521ff?
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effect asserted that La Générale had violated norms of European 
Law, in particular Articles 7 and 52 EEC,52 by increasing its 
capital. Before analyzing the contention of de Jode, the Court 
established that the formulation of economic principles, or the 
most desired economic structure, should be left to the organs of 
the corporation. It then went on to find that under Belgian law, 
no limits are placed on the competence of directors to increase 
the corporation's capital, as long as they take into account the 
enterprise interest in so doing. They also must consider direc­
tives of the general shareholders' meeting (i.e., the last share­
holders meeting had taken place on September 8th, ’1987: interest­
ingly, the Board had tried on that occasion, to push through a
>capital augmentation, but had failed to do so, cf. p. 546). The 
Court went on to say that an augmentation of capital was the only 
means under Belgian law to fend off an unfriendly takeover bid 
running counter to the enterprise interest, even though such a 
course might constitute "détournement de procedure", when aimed 
exclusively at the bid.
The intent of the augmentation allegedly was to maintain a wide­
spread group of shareholders, all in the enterprise interest. 
This stated rationale seems questionable, especially in light of 
the several white knights the Société Générale called upon. In 
February (that is, before the March 1 ruling), several friendly
52. For English Text of these provisions see respectively, supra notes 39 
and 40;

22
camps held significant stakes.53 This circumstance ran counter 
to the decision made in the shareholders' meeting of September 8, 
1987, not to allow any shareholder to exert preponderant influ­
ence .
In deciding whether the Société Générale sufficiently had con­
sidered the enterprise interest, the Court examined certain decla­
rations of La Générale. The Court's findings here, while crucial, 
can only be considered ill-advised: according to the Court's
findings,54 the Société Générale had wanted to reckon with the 
interests of Belgium and its industrial policy. This kind of 
concern, the Court asserted, was completely legitimate, given that 
economic policy on the European plane was still made largely by 
way of national mechanisms. Thus, a Belgian corporation, when 
elaborating its business strategies, could consider national 
interests, especially those relating to employment or industrial 
development. It must be noted that La Générale may be considered 
unusual, due to its control of a considerable number of Belgian 
corporations.55 However, the point remains that the Belgian 
Court deemed the defense of national interests a legitimate goal 
for any Belgian corporation, regardless of its size...
Those corporations most likely to be the target of takeover bids 
are the very large ones, with-'a widespread shareholders' group.
53. See eg. FT 12/2/88;
54. Comm. Bruxelles, 21 RJDC/TBH 512 (1988), p. 523?
55. It controlled 1.261 corporations worldwide at the beginning of 1988, 
according to: PHILLIPS, supra note 45, p 94;
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According to the Court, such a corporation, to the best of its
ability, should always attempt to keep foreign investors from 
influencing national policies. The Court's position might at 
first sight suggest a liberal stance as to the identity of the 
national economic policy maker: i.e. this role is left to the
corporation; However, one could argue instead, that the national 
economic policy maker will usually be a constituent of the (go­
vernment) executive, and not of the corporation. If this turns
out to be the case, many different (industrial) economic policies, 
all advanced by the various large corporations, potentially would 
come into force within one country. However, even were these 
policies to be left to large corporations, it would still remain
unexplained why also small corporations should be guardians of
i
national interests. Nor is it altogether certain, that the econo­
mic policy of a target company is more suitable than the prospec­
tive policy of a bidder. In fact, an unfriendly takeover bid is 
often launched simply because the bidder feels that he is better 
able efficiently to exploit the target's assets.56
Of special importance, the Brussels Appeal Court argued, was 
that the appreciation by the Board of those interests would be 
reasonable, even if this appreciation eventually revealed itself 
erroneous. The Court thus al-lowed the directors a considerable 
amount of latitude in establishing the enterprise interest and the
56. Because the shares are undervalued and because it becomes interesting 
to offer a premium, see references supra note 5;
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interest of Belgium. Such considerations in themselves are laud­
able; nevertheless, the potential for abuse exists. In par­
ticular, directors might stretch their discretion in order to 
secure their own positions, when confronted with a prospective 
unfriendly takeover. Of course, the Court iposited the solution to 
this problem: the general national interests and the enterprise 
interest would have to transcend the private interests of the 
directors.57 The directors' behavior could never contravene any 
tenet in the Single Act, not even the policy of creating the 
internal market, for the reasons cited previously: La Générale's
policy was sound. Does this assertion not perhaps entail a judg­
ment on economic principles/structure, and thus to be avoided by a
judge, as the Court itself set out at the beginning of the case?
i
I
The Court in essence held that no direct effect could be given 
to any provision of the Treaties that incited the Member States to 
give way to their confederal loyalty (?). Articles 7 and 52 EEC 
were not violated, the Court said. The fact that Cerus had been a 
French corporation, had played no role at the augmentation of the 
capital although the Board had stated clearly that La Générale 
should remain in Belgian hands. This last contention seems to 
contain a paradox: a Belgian-'corporation is entitled freely to
57. Comm. Bruxelles, 1 RDC/TBH 512 (1988), p. 523; Cf. business judgment 
rule, infra note 95, as was established, inter alia, in Unocal, infra note 
97; the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff;
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defend national interests and thus keep out any bidder, including 
even a Belgian one. La Générale did not discriminate on the basis 
of nationality, although it not only withdrew the preference 
connected with the shares held by Cerus, but also ensured that the 
capital increase was placed with some white knights, its sub­
sidiaries (which happened to be Belgian controlled). Indeed, the 
Court repeatedly emphasized that a widespread group of sharehold­
ers was paramount to the enterprise interest, even though at the 
time the ruling was delivered, few parties held large blocks of 
shares.
The case was not referred to the EC, for the simple reason that
58there would be no competence under the Treaties.
/The Belgian Court did not detect unreasonableness in the balanc­
ing of capital augmentation with enterprise interests. It is
/ •extremely unlikely that a Community organ would have reached the 
same conclusion. A remark by a European MP may serve to illustra­
te this:59
"Beyond our nationalities and our national interests, we are capable of 
speaking the same language which is the language of European Integration, 
harmonization of law, and company integration at Continental level".
Consistent EC policy in this matter would have necessitated that
Ifair weight would be given to the promotion of competitiveness. 
As later became clear, La Générale had not been run efficiently,
58. See DEBATES European Parliament, OJ Annex No. 2-361 (11/2/88), p. 213: 
Clinton-Davis asserts that: "no approach has been made to the Commission;"
59. Cf. GAWRONSKI RESOLUTION, Doc. B 2 - 1737/87, OJ Annex No. 2-361;
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prior to the takeover bid (nor had there been a fair representa­
tion of national interests on the Board, which consisted com­
pletely of French-speaking aristocrats). De Benedetti's tender 
offer probably woke the dormant directors (albeit to find a white 
knight to protect them). But neither the directors of La Généra­
le, nor the Brussels Court of Appeals can be considered the right 
actors to balance both the national public interest and the en­
terprise interest with the use of (other) defensive tactics. 
Allegedly, the augmentation of capital had been made subordinate 
to the real 'higher aims'; however, the real reason for the aug­
mentation was to dilute the Cerus holding, and tov keep the direc­
tors safely in their seats. The Board of Directors can hardly be 
judged to have been to scrupulous arbiters of crucial national
interests within the course of one night. A decision on such
i
short notice can not, without further justification, be judged a 
reasonable one. The Court should not have reversed the two ru­
lings of January 19 and 20 of the Commercial Chamber of the Brus­
sels Court, on the grounds offered.
That it is not to say that a stand is taken here on the interest 
of La Générale or of de Benedetti; it should suffice to conclude 
here that a neutral arbiter is required where takeover bids are 
launched by one Community actor, whether private or corporate, for 
a corporation in another Member State. Because then there exists 
a more realistic opportunity to weigh other specific interests
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than those of shareholders without the likeliness that the weigh­
ing of those interests will lead to the forcing into a weaker 
position of the foreign bidder. A national court in the country 
of origin of the target just is not the right institution to weigh 
these matters.
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3. REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS IN THE EC
3.1. Introduction
Cross-border takeovers are becoming morei frequent within the EC. 
On the whole, 1986/87 (the last year for which community data are 
available in this respect) showed a 45 % increase in Community
operations; because this figure is not broken down into mergers 
and friendly takeovers on the one hand, and unfriendly takeovers 
on the other, no significant conclusions may be drawn from the 
data for our purposes.60
In this chapter, the regulation of takeover bids in the EC will 
be examined more closely, with specific reference to national
interests. A short analytical excursion will be made into the lawIof some Member States, to illustrate the varying national at­
titudes casu quo rules in this field. The underlying thesis is, 
that national interests as defensive measures are likely to en­
danger the economic integration process. To this effect, a few 
actual cases will be discussed briefly.
|
3.2. National Interests and the Enterprise Interest
The phenomenon of greatly differing business cultures among the 
Member States explains why attitudes towards unfriendly takeovers
60. See Cor data: Seventeenth Report on Competition Policy, Brussels (1988) 
pp. 227ff?
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vary, and also why the EC are posed with substantial technical 
problems. In order to determine the right decisionmaker on the 
content of a national interest, and on its legitimacy, the na­
tional interest -as abstract as this interest is- may alternately 
be viewed on the level of the corporation, or on a more public 
level. Here a short remark will be made on the national interest 
under the legal theory of the enterprise interest, i.e. the social 
interest of the enterprise in itself.
(We will deal with the public interest approach below).
In this theory, the 'corporate actor’ is seen as an autonomous
system of actions, directed at the social function and performance
of the corporation in itself.61 Its aim is to act in the inter­
est of society as a whole, an interest which strengthens the
corporate actor and its autonomy against the several partial
62internal interest groups (directors/shareholders/employees).I .The difficulty in the area of unfriendly takeovers emerges not so 
much in the social function concept of the enterprise, but rather 
where we are forced to identify the individual actions in the 
takeover process.63 It is not difficult to argue that a national 
interest, such as securing employment, -or even symbolic value of 
the corporation-, coincides with the enterprise interest. It is
61. See: TEUBNER, "Unternehmensinteresse - das gesellschaftliche Interesse
des .Unternehmens 'an sich' ?", 149 ZHR 470 (1985), pp. 470-472: "(...) das
Unternehmensinteresse [ist] darauf gerichtet, solche Organisationsstrukturen 
zu schaffen, die eine optimale Abstimmung von gesellschaftlicher Funktion 
und gesellschaftlichen Leistungen des Unternehmens ermöglichen." [emphasis 
in original];
62. Cf. TEUBNER, "Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the 
'Essence' of the Legal Person", 36 Am. Journ. Comp. L. 130 (1988);
63. Ibid., p. 134;
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difficult however, to perceive the role of the corporate actor at 
the time of the takeover bid. Various independent mechanisms are 
in force: the bid tries to pass the directors, by addressing
itself immediately to the shareholders; it affects the employees, 
and the enterprise itself (e.g. organizational structure), but the 
involvement of these constituents is indirect. It would be in­
herently paradoxical then, to leave the actual defense of the 
national interest to the directors, whose position is being 
threatened, or to the shareholders, who are unlikely to be objec­
tive when balancing price and interest, or to the employees, who 
are placed on a side-track. A takeover bid threatens the autonomy 
of the enterprise (even when the bidder is an autonomous corpora­
tion itself). The problem of the national interest also 
encroaches onto the autonomy of the enterprise and shifts the
prospective decision on the desirability of continuation of the
i
- fexisting organizational scheme away from the enterprise, to place 
it at a supra-enterprise level.
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3.3. Community Law regarding takeovers
If we reason from the premise, that a supra-state judgment of 
national interests is required, the question then arises: is this 
adequately dealt with in the EC? i
3.3.1. Foundations/Aims of the Takeover bid Proposal
In the early seventies, the British professor Pennington 
presented a report to the Commission of the EC, regarding takeover 
and other bids;64 the proposal emanating from this report was 
tabled in December 1988.65 It is important to realize, that the 
regulation proposal is concerned solely with takeover bids. The
proposal aims at a Directive in the framework of harmonization of
/Company Law; its legal basis therefore is art. 54 (3) (g) EEC.
The need for harmonization relating to takeover bids basically 
arose out of two completely different causes: on the one hand,
the fact that in business practice, this form of financial opera­
tion, casu quo merger, was becoming increasingly the normal state 
of affairs (cf. the takeover wave at the end of the sixties) with 
the possibilities of fraud or unfair trade practice arising there­
from; on the other hand, as Professor Pennington acknowledged,66
64. PENNINGTON, supra note 2?
65. TAKEOVER BID PROPOSAL, supra note 4;
66. Cf. PENNINGTON, supra note 2, Introduction I-III;
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the various ways in which this problem was regulated, - if regula­
tion was in force at all in the Member States. Consequently, 
as a practical necessity, a basic need for harmonization existed 
under art. 54 of the Treaty of Rome.
The causes for the indefinite postponement of the proposal are not 
clear,67 although it seems that the situation in practice is
largely to be seen as the driving force behind the proposal.68
It goes beyond the scope of this thesis, to present here an 
extensive technical analysis of both the Pennington Report Model 
Directive and the Takeover bid Proposal. It is useful however, to
take a closer look at the legal-political foundations and the aims
underlying the proposal, after which several articles of the
Takeover bid Proposal will be examined.
i
Along with a more general harmonization objective, the legal-Ipolitical foundations of the Draft Directive are three-fold: 1.
6 9the necessity of ensuring equal treatment of all shareholders,
2. the necessity of ensuring the transparency of activities 
relating to the (pre) bidding procedure, and 3. the necessity of 
taking into account interests of other involved parties, such as 
target employees.70
67. "Material Constraints" was one reason for such delay, offered by 
Commissioner Narjes in response to a parliamentary written question by Sir 
Peter Vanneck, of 10 March 1983, Written Question No. 2325/82, OJ No. C 
189/23, Brussels (1983);
68. This would explain why the proposal was finally reanimated in 1987, at 
the time of another takeover wave and the Big Bang in stockmarkets;
69. Which is actually expressly stated in the Commentary and regulated in 
Art. 3, See TAKEOVER BID PROPOSAL, supra note 4;
70. Id.;
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The goals addressed by the proposal parallel these foundations: 
the explanatory memorandum and the article-by-artide commentary 
clearly mention the aims, "to afford shareholders and other 
interested parties equivalent standards of protection before the 
law in all Member States"71 and "to inform those chiefly con­
cerned by the operation of its consequences",72 the latter 
statement being made with regard to employees. If these aims are 
well-considered and if they are supported by an acknowledgement of 
the most important perspectives in force in the Member States, the 
elaboration in the directive of the protection of employees
*T Oappears to be rather weak, as will be seen below.'
;
3.3.2. The Proposal
Re-initiation of a proposal concerning takeover bids came about 
after a Resolution was passed in the EP./4 By way of this 
Resolution, the Parliament called upon the Commission finally to 
submit the proposal, while specifically mandating that there be no 
discrimination between Community citizens and firms.
Interestingly, this Resolution arose at the time of the battle for
. 7 5the Société Générale, which led to some commotion in the EP.
71. Ibid., Explanatory Memorandum para 2, p. 2;
72. Ibid., Commentary Art. 19, p. 19;
73. Cf. BEHRENS, Rechtspolitische Grundsatzfragen einer europäischen Rege­
lung für Übernahmeangebote, 4 ZGR 433 (1975), p. 437;
74. JOINT RESOLUTION, supra note 49;
75. See in particular Docs. B 2-1737/87 and 1760/87;
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The Final draft, adopted by the Commission on December 22 1988,
7 6most likely will not survive in its current form. In treating 
the Draft, a distinction will be made among those provisions 
relating to disclosure matters, those relating to conflicting 
interests and those relating to monitoring.
3.3.2.1. Disclosure Matters
Art. 10 of the proposal sets forth disclosure requirements as to 
the contents of the offer document.77 These are minimum 
prerequisites, and Member States may decide that additional infor­
mation has to be made available. The named requirements seem to 
draw heavily from those in the City Code*on Takeovers and Mergers;
for instance, Art. 10 (1) 1 requires publication of the intentions
1 78of the bidder regarding, inter alia, the target's employees.
This rule suggests that the proposal must take into account some­
what the employees' interests immediately at the occurrence of a 
bid,79 although it is not at all certain whether shareholders
76. For this thesis, the Draft as it stood on February 19th 1989, the date
of its publication, shall be considered to be "the Law". In an interview of 
May 23rd with Ms. Basaldua, attached to DG XV of the Commission and in 
charge of the proposal, I was informed that as of that day, the proposal
was going through the first reading in Parliament and that an advice had
been submitted by the Economic and Social Committee (see below);
77. Art. 11 points out how, and where the offer document should be 
published;
78. Cf. General Principles 15-18 of the City Code; Besides this, Art. 10
(1) l also requires information regarding composition of the Board and 
propective assets' use, whereas Gen. Princ. 15 demands "the long term
commercial justification for the proposed offer" in addition to everything
else;
79. See TAKEOVER BID PROPOSAL, supra note 4, p. 11;
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would be influenced by such information; if the effects on 
employment would be negative but the shareholders’ premium very 
large, public opinion would have to influence the shareholders to 
the extent that they would not tender, which is unlikely to happen 
in reality.
Art. 7 deals with the procedure prior to publication: the offer
document must be communicated to the competent supervisory
8 0authority (see below) and the target board, Art. 7 (3). In
order to retain an open and orderly securities market, Art. 7 (1) 
requires the immediate publication of the intention to launch a 
bid.81
Of special interest is the provision in Art. 14 (1), stating
that the target board must draw up a detailed report giving its
views on the bid and setting out arguments for and against accept-
i
8 2ance. According to the Commentary, this provision is aimed
mainly at friendly takeovers.83 One of the weaknesses of the 
proposal is highlighted here: it does not explicitly distinguish 
between friendly and unfriendly takeovers. Obviously, if the bid 
is unwelcome to the target board, it will do anything in its power 
to fend off the bid. To "legalize" the possibility of the target
80. Cf. the Pennington Model Directive, Art. 4, which sets out a seven days
window;
The . period for acceptance, should be stated in the offer document and may
not be less than four, not more than ten weeks, Art. 12; Cf. the Williams
Act and the City Code;
81. Cf. PROPOSAL for a Council Directive coordinating regulation on insider 
trading, COM(87) 111 final, OJ C 153/8, Brussels (1987);
82. Cf. Gen. Princ. 17 (2) of the City Code, which speaks of "advising" and
merely requires disclosures of target shareholdings in the bidder;
83. Commentary, pp. 16-17;

36
board offering "its views" could constitute needless encourage­
ment for the target to exert undue influence upon its shareholders 
under the guise of a required report.84 It would be more logical 
to distinguish more plainly between unfriendly and friendly 
takeover bids under this heading.
The mentioned articles85 show that openness is the name and 
disclosure the game; however, less thought seems to have been 
given to the usefulness of certain disclosures.
3«3.2.2. Conflicting Interests
As the Pennington Report asserted on several occasions, the
i
competition aspects of a takeover are an entirely different matter 
and therefore should not be regulated by the proposal at con-I8 S. *sideration. Pennington ignored the fact, however, that other
aspects, such as public (national) interest may play a role in
certain takeover bids. Art. 13 (d) of the Takeover bid Proposal
provides somewhat enigmatically that a bid may be withdrawn "where
the necessary judicial or administrative authorization is not
8 7obtained...", and then refers to merger control authorization.
84. At any rate, target boards in unfriendly takeover battles always try 
everything to persuade their shareholders, the public etc. that the takeover 
is bad, (see the GEC/Plessey battle for a fine example of this). The fact, 
that the Board is supposed to act in the best interests of the company, 
Commentary p. 17, does not detract anything from the doubtfulness of Art. 
14?
85. Also dealing with disclosure is Art. 18, publication of the result of a 
bid?
86. See e.g. PENNINGTON, supra note 2, Introduction III, para 77, etc.?
87. Art. 13 deals with permitted withdrawals of takeover bids;
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At any rate, it means that a national authority is just as able as 
a Community authority to refuse authorization. This Article is of 
quintessential importance for our argument, as will be 
demonstrated in chapter 5.
The proposal also tries to balance corporate actors' interests. 
Launching a bid becomes mandatory as soon as 33 1/3 % of the 
voting rights in a certain corporation have been acquired, al­
though Member States may fix a lower threshold, Art. 4; the ratio 
here is shareholders' protection, as may be seen from Art. 3;
With respect to Art. 8, the Commentary notes that managers must 
act in the interests of the company. Yet, Art. 8 (a) clearly is 
aimed at protecting shareholders' interests: it prohibits poison
pills, or at least the issuance of securities carrying voting
rights without shareholders' approval1 after an Art. 7 (1) dis-
, 88 closure.
/Although protection of employees' interests is a fundamental 
objective, according to the Commentary, Art. 19 only states 
briefly that the target board must communicate certain documents, 
such as the offer document (which may be found in a national 
newspaper anyhow) to any existing workers' representatives. The 
delineated role of the employees can hardly be less passive than 
that of their counterparts in American takeover battles. When we
88. It is unlikely that this provision will survive, as it stands today;
If Art. 8 could have consequences for Dutch practice it is noteworthy that 
several triggering measures still would be permitted; e.g. the issuance of 
certain options in respect of unissued shares (cf. rule 21 sub (b) City
Code); Meanwhile, Dutch corporations e.g. strongly oppose Art. 8; Source 
of information: private conversation with Mr. D. Cross of the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange, on May 23, 1989;
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compare the final Draft with Pennington's Model Directive, the
Q QDraft seems to be little more than a weakness bid. At least in 
Pennington's Draft the board was to present a written explanation 
of the bid document to its workers within seven days after the bid 
had been launched, as well as its opinion on the prospective 
takeover and its consequences, within fourteen days. Furthermore, 
the Board was compelled to discuss it with the employees (' repre­
sentatives), Art. 13 A of Pennington's Model Directive. Then too, 
workers retained the right to express their opinions on the matter 
in written (not very earthmoving competences). Why are these not 
found in the present version of the proposal?
The preamble asserts that the drafters took the Social Policy of 
the Community into account, but except for two rather insig­
nificant references to employees, no further steps are taken to
9 0secure their interests in the case of a takeover. The TakeoverIbid Proposal is markedly shareholder- and transparency- minded.
3.3.2.3. Monitoring
The most severe flaw o f (the proposal lies in its failure to
t
provide a Community-level supervisory authority. In an
89. Cf. PENNINGTON, supra note 2, paras. 98-100;
90. Although workers' representatives do have some rights under the Council 
Directive of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of 
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses, 77/187 EEC 
OJ No. L 61/77, Brussels (1977);

Information Memo of last December91 the Commission stated that 
takeovers promote integration. However, in the case of a cross- 
border takeover bid, a national authority would be competent, and 
then only to ensure that the technical demands regarding the 
bidding procedure, as set out in the Directive Proposal, were to 
be put into effect.
In addition to relegating the matter of installing a national 
supervisory authority to the discretion of the Member States, Art. 
6 of the proposal (which deals with the supervisory authority) 
also leaves it to the Member States to decide what kind of super­
visory authority should be installed; as for example, in the UK 
the Takeover Panel, in the Netherlands the St'ichting Toezicht
Q  9Effectenverkeer, in France the Commission des Operations de 
9 3Bourse, in Belgium the Commission Bancaire, in the FRG the
Bundeskartellamt??? Is it likely that these varied bodies, whichI
are not only defending various interests but also rather special­
ized, will effectively screen even the disclosure requirements? 
Not to mention those varied other interests.
Of paramount importance is the fact that these authorities most 
likely will work from a national point of view and consequently 
will make it more difficult for a bidder from another Member 
State, to redeem his bid.
39
91. INFORMATION MEMO, supra note 1; relevant quotation in text;
92. See BESLUIT Minister van Financien, "Toezicht Beurswezen", Den Haag
(1989);
93. PROJET DE LOI, Ministère de l'économie, des finances et du budget, "sur
la sécurité et la transparence du marché financier", Paris (1989);
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Moreover, as mentioned previously, a national supervisory 
authority would in theory only be competent in matters set out in 
the Directive. As will be demonstrated, a gap might exist here: 
even if transparency interests are defended, and even if there are 
no anti-competitive effects, a takeover might infringe on other 
interests. These interests are perceived to be national issues, 
as was illustrated in chapter 2 by the description of a the de 
Benedetti procedure, involving a bidder from another Member State.
The Takeover bid Proposal was discussed in a meeting of the
9 4Economic and Social Committee of the EC, on 17 April 1989. 
According to the Committee, the most glaring weakness of the
proposed Directive is the lack of punitive measures, but more
9 5 1importantly:
”(.♦.) the failure to provide for Community-level supervision and overall 
responsibility, as might reasonably have been expected."
9 6The Commission is not in favor of this argument. Two factors 
help explain this lack of enthusiasm: (1) the current proposal is 
for a directive, thereby leaving its legal elaboration to the 
Member States and (2) it will be very difficult, to produce a 
uniform non-compromise text, which recognizes the need to monitor 
other than competition interests at a Community level.
94. See: WORKING DOCUMENT, of the Section for Economic, Financial and
Monetary Questions on the Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on 
Company Law concerning Takeover and Other General Bids, R/CES 376/89 — SYN 
186 hm Brussels (1989);
95. Ibid., p. 2 ;
96. As I was informed in a private communication, by Mr. Fransisco Drago, 
Rapporteur of the Economic and Social Committee;
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3.3.3. Related Community Law and Court Decisions
The Community's competence in the field of takeovers arises 
first and foremost in the context of Articles 85 and 86 EEC.97 
Neither of these specifically applies to takeovers; only the 
merger control regulation, if adopted, would establish direct 
competence in this field. The Continental Can case, prohibiting a
Q  Qtakeover on the basis of Art. 86, contains the only formal
decision adopted by the Communities. It held that this article
applies only when one of the companies concerned has a dominant
9 9position; there must be substantial effects on competition. In
/
the Court's opinion, the problem with regard to Art. 86 EEC was 
whether, on its own, it was an adequate instrument of merger 
control.100 Because the Commission was not allowed to grant an 
exemption to those takeovers (mergers), which although they came
97. Art. 85 (3) EEC provides for exemptions to the rule of Art. 85 (1)>
which states that "all agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States and Which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common 
market (...)" shall be prohibited as incompatible; Art. 86 EEC gives some 
examples of abuse of dominant positiQflr* within the common market, which shall 
be prohibited as incompatible "in so far as it may affect trade between 
Member States";
98. Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. Inc. v. 
Commission, E.C.R. 215 (1973);
99. I.e. prevention of effective competition in the relevant market, 
because a company enjoys position of economic strength and is able to behave 
independenttly from its competitors (and customers/consumers). Case 85/76, 
Hoffman La Roche and Co. A.G. v. Commission, E.C.R. 461 (1979), p. 520;
100. Cf. KLUWER ED., Merger Control in the EEC, Deventer (1988), pp. 239ff;
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under the Art. 86 prohibition, would prove nonetheless to be in 
the Community interest, for instance because such takeover would 
bring benefits relating to employment or would be essential for 
regional development. This restriction made it impossible for the 
Commission to take these factors into account in attempting to 
promote the Community interest.101
In the Philip Morris case, the Court found that Art. 85 may be 
applicable to acquisitions.102 As one of the essential considera­
tions the Court stated that an agreement whereby one company 
acquires a shareholding in a competitor can fall within art. 85, 
where it is shown that the acquisition of such shareholding can 
have the effect of restricting competition. This occurs both when 
the interest acquired is a minority interest, and where the in­
vesting company acquires legal or de facto control over the
/commercial conduct of the other company. The Court did not ad­
dress the particular difficulties of applying this article to 
unfriendly takeover bids. Upon closer scrutiny, such an applica­
tion would seem possible in a strictly legal sense, but completely
101. That the Commission was willing ;to do so may be deduced inter alia from 
statements in e.g. the Tenth Report on Competition Policy (1980), point 21;
102. Cases 142/84 and 156/84, British American Tobacco Company Limited and 
R.J. Reynolds Industries inc. v. Commission of the EC, supported by Philip 
Moryis Inc. and Rembrandt Group limited, 4 C.M.L.R. 24 (1988); See FEENSTRA,
"Fusiecontrole door de EEG na het Philip Morris arrest", 66 NV 2 (1988); 
FINE, "The Philip Morris judgement: Does Article 85 now extend to mergers?",
8 Eur. Comp. L. Rev. 4 (1987); KORAH, LASOK, "Philip Morris and its after- 
math - merger control?", 25 C.M.L.Rev. 333 (1988); RIESENKAMPF, "Auswirkung­
en des Urteils EuGH vom 17.11.1987 ('Philip Morris')*', 38 WuW 465 (1988);
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impracticable in reality.103
The interpretation of paragraph 31 might lead to the conclusion 
that Art. 85 would apply when there is an agreement104 and where 
parties remain independent; However, analogous to art. 85, those 
parties must be deemed to be 'undertakings'. Consequently, this 
provision would apply to an investor company, but not to single 
shareholders. This seems to be the view of the Commission. 
Moreover, it would be practicably impossible to trace all original 
sellers of the shares, when those agreements would be declared 
null and void ex Art. 85 (2).
Of prime importance is whether Community interests override 
national interests. First, it must be remembered that concurrent
jurisdiction exists in the field of merger and takeover control.
iIConcurrent jurisdiction in the EC was established in the Walt 
Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt case.105 The parallel application of 
national and Community law is possible as long as the application 
of national law does not imperil the full and uniform application 
of Community law: Community law takes precedence where there is a
!
i
103. See KLUWER, supra note 100, pp. 275-279; Cf. in this respect para. 31
of the Philip Morris case? "Since the acquisition of shares of Rothmans 
Inc. was the subject matter of agreements entered into by companies which 
have remained independent after the entry into force of the agreements, the 
issue must be examined first of all from the point of view of Art. 85";
104. even in the case of a friendly bid, doubts as to the existence of an
agreement prevail: the Board of the target (undertaking) could e.g.
independently advise the shareholders to tender to the bidder; in this case, 
there would be no agreement;
105. Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, E.C.R. 1 (1969);
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conflict. However, the Commission has also asserted that no 
objection is permitted to a prohibition on the basis of stricter 
national law.10® At any rate, under the proposed Merger Control 
Regulation, concurrent jurisdiction applies. This is not the case 
for the Takeover bid Proposal.
The Merger Control Proposal107 will not receive detailed 
analysis here. Suffice it to say, the Regulation will encompass
concentrations with a Community dimension, even if they do not
108fall within the scope of Articles 85/86. The Merger Control
Proposal foresees in the prior notification of concentrations 
(Art. 4), but does not compel suspension of a notified takeover 
bid, provided that the acquirer does not yet exercise the voting
109rights attached to the shares in question. This means that no
/
106. See Tenth report on Competition Policy (1980), point 155? On the other
hand, Commission officials have argued that Community law overrides,
According to HORNSBY, "National and Community Control of Concentrations in a 
Single Market: Should Member States be Allowed to Impose Stricter Standards
?", 13 Bur. L. Rev. 295 (1988); Hornsby concludes that Community supremacy 
in this field is weak on both) legal and political grounds;
107. AMENDED PROPOSAL for A Council Regulation (EEC) on the control of
concentrations between undertakings, COM (88) 734 final - revised version,
OJ C 22/06r Brussels (1989); C
See inter alia: SUTHERLAND, "The New Proposals of the Commission on
Concentration Control", Eur. Aff. 46 (1988); KORAH, "The Control of Mergers 
under EEC Competition Law", 8 Eur. Comp. L. Rev. 3 (1987);
108. The Community dimension is determined on turnover consideration 
grounds, so that e.g. not every cross-border bid would fall per se under the 
scope of the Regulation. The Commission then has the power, ex Art. 8 (1) 
Regulation, to decide whether a concentration with a Community dimension is 
compatible with the common market;
109. Cf. TAKEOVER BID PROPOSAL, supra note 4, Art. 13 (d);
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decisions are made by the bidder about the target corporation, as 
long as the concentration issue has not been settled.
The Merger Control Proposal does not clarify the issue, simply 
because, from the perspective of this thesis, anti-competitiveness 
is not necessarily the stake. At any rate, it still is possible 
that that target of an unfriendly bid will try to exploit the 
competition question as a defensive measure.110 The original 
Merger Control Proposal did contain an exemption in Art. 1 (3) for 
mergers "which are indispensable to the attainment of an objective 
which is given priority treatment in the common interest of the 
Community"; this provision thus left more space to take into
account interests other than competition, such as stake interests.
f 111It has not survived in the current proposal. The revised
proposal somewhat enigmatically provides in the preamble (points
/27-28) that, although in principle national legislation is 
preempted by the regulation, Member States may take appropriate
110. The legal strategy to refer a bid to national or Community competition 
policy authorities, in order to thwart the bid; The conclusions as to this 
tactic is that directors should put such arguments directly to shareholders: 
LOFTHOUSE, "Competition Policies as Take-over Defences", Journ. of Bus. Law 
320 (1984);
111. Cf. Art. 2 (3) of the Merger .Control Regulation Proposal; Meanwhile,
the Commission is of the opinion that the provision of employment falls
under the Art. 85 (3) exemption, if it is deemed to improve general
conditions of production; See: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 1765/88, of David
Martin, OJ No. C 180/74, 17 July 1989, Brussels (1989); Mr. Martin wanted
to know, whether the Commission provides measures for the protection of
regional markets, with specific reference to extra-Community takeovers. The 
answer offered gave the employment example, after relentlessly having 
repeated once again the aims of the Merger Control Proposal and the Takeover 
bid Proposal;
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measures to protect legitimate interests "other than those 
pursued by this Regulation". Here, the Commission may take into
consideration national interests. Consequently, the question 
remains: who should determine whether these interests are
legitimate? According to the Commission, (national interests must 
be "sufficiently defined and protected by domestic law" and must
be compatible with the other provisions of Community law. In any 
case, the Commission does not establish through the proposed 
Regulation the power to decide these specific interests at 
Community level, nor is this done, as has been argued above, by
the Takeover bid Proposal; it leaves the question as to their
legitimacy to the discretion of the Member States ('authorities).
The Council Directive 77/187 and the Tenth Council DirectiveIcontain additional rules. The first directive is concerned with 
employees' rights. It provides in Art. 4 (1), that a transfer of 
a company does not in itself constitute dismissal. However, it 
goes on to state that changes in the workforce are justified for 
economic, technical or organizational reasons. Where does that
leave us with regard to protection of employees at the completion
i
of a takeover bid? (Needless to say here, there is no adequate 
provision, dealing with the active involvement of employees at the 
time of a takeover threat. Only Art. 6 (1) sets forth certain
information to be disclosed, such as the reasons for transfer, the 
legal economic and social implications, and measures envisaged in
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relation to employees). The Tenth Council Directive (proposal)
concerns cross-border mergers, and although it explicitly brings 
under its scope takeovers (Art. 3 (1)), it does not clarify the 
issue. Art. 10 (1) states that the law of the Member States, if 
requiring preventive judicial or administrative supervision, shall 
apply to the involved companies (the law of the company to be 
acquired takes precedence. Thus the Member States may once more 
implement nationalistic rules which may run counter to the 
Integration goal).113
112
/
112. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 77/187, supra note 90;
113. PROPOSAL, for a Tenth Council Directive based on Art. 54 (3) (g) of the
Treaty concerning cross-border mergers of public limited companies, COM (84) 
727 final, OJ No. C 23/11 Brussels (1985);
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3.4. Regulation o£ takeovers in certain Member States
3.4.1. Developments regarding takeovers in the OK
The relevance of British regulation and practice in this field 
is clear: a highly active market114 and, more important for our
purposes, an extraordinary means for the protection of national 
interests.
The first striking aspect of the British system is that regula­
tion is extralegal, in the form of self-regulation by the City 
Panel, manifested in The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (City
115 'Code), a code of conduct. Generally speaking, the aims of the
City Code are shareholder equality and openness of procedure. ItIechoes aspects of the Williams Act, in that both require exten­
sive disclosure, a minimum duration for offers and pro-rata
114. There are many reasons for this: sophisticated financial mechanisms
being one of the most eminent: due to the complexity and awkwardness of
corporate statute law in relation to mergers, many transactions, though
intended as such, are being structured as takeover bids, which can be
executed more simply and quickly in the UK; DEMOTT, supra note 66; DE
ANGELIS, "L'Evoluzione della Disciplina delle Offerte Pubbliche di Acquisito
in Gran Bretagna", Riv. Soc. 6 (1986);-.
115. PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, The City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers, London (1988); Recently, the City Panel stressed its discontent 
with the Takeover bid Proposal which, according to the Panel, lacks
flexibility and might lead to costly litigation. The regulator needs broad 
discretion and this discretion should not be susceptible to litigation, as 
otherwise litigation might be employed as a defensive measure. The Panel 
feels it is functioning adequately, it even provides consultation in
advance, see: THE TAKEOVER PANEL, EC Directive on the Conduct of Takeovers, 
General Comment by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, London (1989);
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acceptance of oversubscribed partial bids.116 However, these 
partial bids require Panel approval.117 In contrast, a particular 
difference with the American situation is that under the British 
rules anyone who (in concert) has acquired 30 % or more of the 
shares is obliged to bid for the remaining shares at the highest 
price, paid for the (part of) the stake already held .118 This 
practice rule has been followed by the Commission in its proposal, 
Art. 4. Another rule with no counterpart in the Williams Act is 
that all bids must first be put to the target's board or the
LI 9advisers, who then must obtain "competent independent advice".
Possibly the most important feature of the City Code is the 
larger role it allows shareholders to play. The Code provides in 
rule 21 that the shareholder meeting must approve any defensive
measure which the target board tries to mount in response to the
• Ibid. The board is forbidden, inter alia, to enter into contracts 
"otherwise than in the ordinary course of business"; this rule 
reappears in substantially the same form in Art. 8 of the Takeover
116. FRAZER, "Regulation of Takeovers in Great Britain", in: COFFEE EDS.,
supra note 18, p. 438;
117. City Code, Rule 36, cf. the Takeover bid Proposal, Art. 4 (3); See
also DEMOTT, "Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation", in: COFFEE 
EDS., supra note 18, p. 408: shareholders may tender, and yet vote against 
the .transaction itself;
118. Ratio again is that with 30 %, effective control may be administered.
See also: VOOGD, Statutaire Beschermingsmiddelen bij Beursvennootschappen, 
Deventer (1989), pp. 335-347;
119. Rule 1 note 78; See: DEMOTT, supra note 117, p. 409; This requirement 
seems to have been followed by Art. 7 (3) of the Takeover bid Proposal;
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In the UK, there are many other sources of takeover regula- 
121tion. If the takeover is likely to affect the public interest
(specifically competition), the UK Secretary of State and Industry 
may refer a bid to the Merger and Monopolies Commission (MMC), 
after advice of the OFT. A ground other than effects on competi­
tion is to be found in the concerned provision of the FTA 1973:
"(...) maintaining and promoting the balanced distribution of
122industry in the UK (...)" . However, under this provision the
MMC are required to take into account "all matters which appear to 
them in the particular circumstances to be relevant".
The British confectionery manufacturer Rowntree tried to achieve 
such a referral on public interest grounds, when confronted with a
' 12 4bid last year by Nestle, the Swiss food company. In this case,Istrong public pressure for government intervention existed. It
12 5was argued that Rowntree was a historical British asset. This
is an example of the symbolic national interest argument, but was
bid Proposal.120
120. Whereas under the City Code, this requirement applies as soon as a bid 
might become imminent, Art,. 8 of the Proposal requires this conduct only 
after publication of the intention. Art 7 (1);
121. For an overview, see VOOGD, supra note 118, pp. 335-338;
122. Fair Trading Act 1973, Sec. 84 .(.1);
123. See: KLUWER, supra note 100, p. 208; The MMC would thus examine novel
features too. However, especially under the 'Tebbit doctrine', see VOOGD, 
supra note 118, p. 337, the MMC seemed to restrain their competences almost 
solely to cover those mergers which affect competition; See also: "How not
to make Merger Policy", The Economist, 14/5/88, p. 39;
124. For details see: MORTON, "Out-smartied", 7 Int'l Fin. L. Rev. 24
(1988);
125. See: "A Brandstand View of British Chocolate", The Economist, 30/4/88, 
p. 69;
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not dealt with by the Secretary of Trade and Industry. It was
coupled with insubstantial arguments of regional interests, and 
interestingly, the reciprocity issue: Rowntree was not able to
launch a similar bid for Nestlé under Swiss corporate practice. 
The bid was not referred eventually, as it was determined that the 
impact on UK competition was the key criterion.126 Under the 
Takeover bid Proposal, the EC Member States are allowed to 
prohibit a takeover bid from a third country, especially where 
Community nationals do not benefit from reciprocal treatment for
acquiring shares by takeover bids in that third country.127
Nevertheless, a country is free to stipulate' whether or not 
reciprocity is required.
}
A stronger argument against the Nestlé bid was put forward in
12 8the Economist , which asserted that under UK competition law, itIwas impossible for Rowntree to conduct a friendly merger with
Cadbury Schweppes, a fellow British confectioner, at that same 
time confronted with an unfriendly foreign bid, as the combined 
market share would then lead to a UK dominant position. It was 
thus conceded that the frame of réference for any merger should be 
a European one.
126. See FT 4-4/2/89, with regard to another example of the reciprocity 
argument.
127. See INFORMATION MEMO, supra note 1, p. 3;
128. "Storm in a chocolate cup", The Economist, 28/5/88, see also MORTON, 
supra note 232;
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Another example of national interests is provided by the
Ferruzzi case: the MMC eventually blocked to separate takeover
attempts (by Ferruzzi-Italian and Tate & Lyle-British) for S & W
Berisford (which controls British Sugar), on competition restric- 
129tion grounds. Ferruzzi's bid met strong opposition,
essentially on nationalistic/political grounds. The Ferruzzi 
company advanced the argument that the public policy exception of 
Art. 56 EEC (Art. 52-58 being applicable in this case), could only 
be invoked where Community, rather than national, interests were 
at stake. It would therefore contravene EC law to prohibit 
Ferruzzi from proceeding with the bid, when Tate & Lyle did not
face a similar prohibition.130 The MMC did not deal with this
targument in its recommendation. The argument has been advanced
however, that there would be more ground to block the Tate & Lyle
/attempt, than the Ferruzzi bid, since the former would most cer­
tainly have led to the creation of a virtual monopoly in the UK
sugar market, whereas this would be less sure in the latter
case.131 The point remains, that an ex-post Community scrutiny
might have been useful and that it might have led to another
conclusion as to the acceptability of the Ferruzzi attempt.
129.. See: Tate and Lyle pic and Ferruzzi Finanziaria SpA and S & W Berisford 
pic - A report on the existing and proposed mergers, Cmnd. 89 (1987);
130. Apparently, Ferruzzi feared that public opinion in the UK would impede 
its attempt and it was not sure, whether the same would be the case for the 
Tate & Lyle attempt;
131. See KLUWER, supra note 100; HORNSBY, supra note 106, pp. 314-316;
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As noted at the beginning of this paragraph, the British do 
possess a special device to protect national interests, i.e. 
British Control restrictions, in which the government wishes to 
ensure that enterprises, which are determined to be of a national 
interest are reserved for British ownership.132 It is likely that 
these restrictions will not survive under EC law.133 However, 
these provisions in the articles of privatised companies usually 
are entrenched by special rights attached to a so-called golden
share,134 held by the Treasury solicitor on behalf of the British
135government. It is more difficult to maintain that such a share
would be contrary to EC law, as so many dérogations are embedded 
in the Treaty of Rome. Moreover, a golden share does not dis­
criminate only against foreign bidders. It is more likely to be
challenged under equality of shareholders' grounds.I
Having examined UK practice, it is striking to see how much of 
this is being put in the Takeover bid Proposal (that is, except 
for referral to a special authority on public interest grounds, 
such as a national interest). Such a referral however, will
132. See EMMERSON, "EC Takeover s.*;- golden shares and British Control", 7
Int’l. Fin. L. Rev. 11 (1988); They usually prevent acquisitions of hol­
dings of more than 15 or 25 % by non-British citizens;
133. EMMERSON, ibid., p. 12ff, who argues on the basis of articles 85 (1),
52 and 67 respectively of the Treaty of Rome;
134. The golden share generally provides that certain alterations to the 
articles may not be made without the consent of its holder;
135. Such as Jaguar, Rolls Royce, Britoil; See VOOGD, supra note 118, p. 340 
note 90. In case of Britoil the UK government used its golden share to 
obtain important concessions from British Petroleum...
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probably not succeed, despite a public interest rationale. 
Nevertheless, sec. 84 (1) (d) of the FTA 1973 does leave room for 
protection of the national employment stake.
3.4.2. Developments regarding takeovers in the Netherlands
The relevance of Dutch practice regarding takeovers is two-fold: 
first, in the debate regarding curtailing the existing legally 
valid scale of defensive tactics; second, in the rules regarding 
rights of employees.
1. In an annex to its annual report of:1985, the Association of
I
the Dutch Stock Exchange (Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel,
/further: VEH) for the first time voiced its doubts with regard to 
the prevailing opinion in Dutch business.136 That opinion had
asserted that a corporation should not fall in other hands against
137its will (i.e. against the will of its Board of Directors). On
the basis of this report and annex, a commission "Defensive 
Tactics" was installed  ^in order to review inter alia whether 
"these arrangements made by stock exchange quoted corporations,
136. See generally on VEH: CROSS, "Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel, haar 
positie en regelgevend beleid", 38 AA 25 (1989);
137. BARON VAN ITTERSUM, "De Aandeelhouder, Beschermingsconstructies en de 
Effectenbeurs", not published (1987);
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are acceptable...".138
Netherlands law does not contain provisions regarding maximum 
allowed voting rights by foreigners in Dutch corporations. This 
does not mean, however, that national interests have not been 
protected under Dutch law; indeed, quite the contrary is true. 
The cornerstone of the practice regarding defensive tactics has 
been identified as being an attempt to ensure the national iden­
tity of Dutch corporations.139 Indeed, Dutch Company law has 
recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, the possibility of 
some rather original defensive tactics, to be employed by corpora­
tions, irrespective of the event of a takeover threat.140 The
138. RAPPORT, supra note 31/ p. 6?
139. Ibid., p. 8;
140. Although we cannot engage in a thorough analysis here, it is
interesting to look at these typically Dutch "instruments": 1. Priority
shares, which place e.g. the right of binding recommendation for nomination
of Directors in the hands of their holders, cf. Art. 133 (3) Book 2 of the
Dutch Civil Code, or the right to decide on share issuance? note that these
shares are then usually placed with a foundation, set up for these purposes, 
the Board of which consists of Directors and Board members of the 
corporation! 2. Preference shares, cf. Artt. 80, 96, 105 Book 2? again,
these shares are placed with a foundation, whose statutory objective often 
is promotion of independence and continuity of the corporation; actually,
these shares limit shareholders* voting rights, the legal basis is Art. 118
Book 2? 3. Certification, the ■ shares are held by an "Administration Office", 
which issues bearer shares, that have no voting rights attached! The most
radical infringement on shareholders' voting rights are the so-called non- 
convertible certificates, a permanent disconnection of the right to exert
control, as these cannot be changed back into "normal" shares? 4. Joint or
National Holding: the shares in the corporation or an important stake are
placed in this holding, which by itself issues shares; 5. lastly, the
"structure” corporation, see e.g. BUYS "Overname: goedschiks of
kwaadschiks", T W S  283, (1988), who contends that this structure was
actually never set up as a defensive tactic. In this case, many important
decisions are taken by the supervisory board, instead of the general
(Footnote continues on next page)
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sense of these constructions is, that a company should not be 
taken over if this takeover would harm the enterprise interest.'1'41 
The advantage of such provisions over legal regulations, which 
would restrict foreign ownership, is that they make no distinction 
between national and foreign shareholders, so that no discrimina­
tion exists, when corporate tactics are being employed. However, 
upon closer analysis of the actual goal of these provisions, 
discrimination against the interests of foreigners definitely 
appears to be an objective. Maeijer openly acknowledges that 
national interests should be calculated, especially where the 
enterprise can be considered vital to the national economy.142 
These arguments are unconvincing where they are sustained by an 
untenable nationalistic attitude.
(Footnote continued from previous page)
meeting, such as the appointment of Directors (which would make an 
unfriendly takeover ineffective). This regime is mandatory for certain
types of large corporations;
See generally: RAPPORT, supra note 31, pp. 12-24, HONEE, supra noce 11;
141. MAEIJER, MBeursoverval op Beschermingsconstructies", NJB 517, (1988), 
mentions "the interest of the corporation and its connected enterprise, 
which is more than just the shareholders’ interest” explicitly referring to 
employees' rights in this context. According to him, shareholders should 
not decide over the heads of the directors, who is to govern the corpora­
tion, a position which is completely contrary to that of his Anglo-American 
colleagues (and some Dutch);
142. MAEIJER, ibid., p. 519; Cf. GLASZ, supra note 14, p. 168; RIETKERK,
"Bestuursonvriendeli jke overneming: countervailing power'*, 66 NV 45, (1988) 
does not agree, basing his arguments on economic analysis of takeovers; 
BRENTJENS, "Beschermingsconstructies, een ondernemersvisie**, 66 NV 81 (1988) 
hides his true motivation to promote defensive tactics behind a blunt 
statement on national interests: "It is important for the Netherlands to
maintain a strong national industry with international ramifications [after 
1992 ]. We have built this up in the past."
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Meanwhile, the VEH was forced to retreat somewhat after it tried 
to curb the excessive use by Dutch corporations of defensive 
tactics in 1988.143
Thus, despite the many arguments offered for the current situa­
tion, the Dutch takeover market remains extremely closed to 
unfriendly bidders* No empirical evidence is offered in Dutch 
literature as to whether this is good or bad, and only popular 
arguments are put forward.
2. The core of regulations regarding employees' rights in 
takeovers is consultation of workers' representatives before the 
important decisions are being taken, thereby adding greater weight 
and legitimacy to their advice.144 This'points at a significant
143- See: "RAPPORT van de Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel inzake de
toepassing van Beschermingsconstructies", Amsterdam (1988), in which the VEH 
wanted to go beyond the advice of the commission "Beschermingsconstructies"; 
the commission had argued for independence of the directors of the 
foundations which hold preference shares, as well as the directors of 
"Administration Offices", see supra note 248 . The VEH wanted to go further: 
with relation to issuance of preference shares: no more than 50 % of the put 
out capital should be issued without shareholders’ approval; Next to this,
it wanted to counter cumulation of statutory defensive tactics: not more
than one permanent construction (see above) next to preference shares. On 
January 5th 1989, after a lot of pressure from business groups, the VEH 
withdrew its recommendations;
144. To be understood here also as trade unions; the reasons that trade 
unions should be consulted are: ~ - not all corporations have a Board of 
workers' representatives (see: Wet op de Ondernemingsraden), - the important 
legal consequences for the employees of the target, after its acquisition by 
the bidder, - the sectoral consequences as the acquisition might lead to 
reorganization of branches of industry and trade unions are organized by 
sector; See: BLOEMARTS, "Onvriendelijke Overnemingen; De Positie van
Vakbeweging en Ondernemingsraad", 66 NV 54 (1988); UNIKEN VENEMA, "De
(Footnote continues on next page)
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difference in the role of employees in the Netherlands, in com­
parison with the US and the EC (proposal).
Although in principle the relevant rules relate to 'merger 
talks', certain competences can be inferred from the elaboration 
of these rules. Art. 20 of the Dutch Merger Code of Conduct 
(further quoted as the SER-fusiecode), refers to rights of trade 
unions in the case of an unfriendly takeover bid.145 The bidder 
must inform the trade unions about his plans before he sets the 
price he will offer for the shares. This communication must 
include: 1. the motives for the takeover, 2. the expected social, 
economic and legal consequences, and if they are foreseeable, 3. 
the measures to be taken in relation thereto, Art. 20 (1) jo. Art. 
18 (3) SER-fusiecode. On the basis of Art. 18 (4) (jo. Art. 20
(1)), the trade unions must be allowed to offer a detailed opinion
(Footnote continued from previous page)
Medenzeggenschap van Werknemers ingeval van fusies door openbare biedingen 
op aandelen", VAN VENNOOTSCHAPPELIJK BELANG, Opstellen aangeboden aan Prof. 
Mr. J.J.M. Maeijer, Zwolle (1988);
145. BESLUIT van de Sociaal-Econoinische Raad van 21 november 1975 tot 
vaststelling van de Fusiegedragsregels 1975; These rules relate to required
conduct when preparing or making a public takeover bid. Interestingly» the 
Commentary states that shareholders' interests are not protected, in the 
case- of a tender offer, to be understood here as a partial offer for (a 
certain class of) shares, although employees' rights are in such a case!
See: Fusiegedragsregels-Conunentary, SER, (6th ed. 1988), p. 11; This gave
rise to a big controversy in the unfriendly Audet—VNU offer in 1988, see
inter alia: GLASZ, supra note 14, p. 166;
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from the perspective of the employees at a special meeting.146 
Moreover, ex Art. 18 (5) the trade unions have a right further to 
be informed on request. Of course, the said rules only come into 
play where the bidder is a corporation, although this is not 
expressly said in the SER-fusiecode. Art. 20 (2) provides that 
the bidder must inform the target of its intention at least seven 
days in advance.147 The target board then immediately must inform 
the trade unions, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 18 
(3)— (5) set out above. It must obtain the advice of the trade 
unions before it announces publicly its views on the bid, or to 
its shareholders.
Because the trade unions will be informed at various stages from 
both sides (they are, contrary to the'Boards of workers' repre­
sentatives, not linked with a certain corporation), the entities 
providing information most likely will not disclose everything, so
148 .that the facts are not 'matched'. However, a sanction exists
for non-compliance with the SER-rules, namely public reprimand or 
(weaker) statement. Moreover, a further sanction that is not 
explicitly mentioned in the SER-fusiecode, but can be deduced, is
146. Art. 18 (4) sets out in detail „.what could be discussed at such a 
meeting, inter alia the foundations of future social policy. However, as 
BLOEMARTS, supra note 144, argues, because there is no deliberation with the 
target it will be impossible to inform them adequately of the possible 
consequences as the bidder*s board itself lacks the necessary information;
147. Cf. Art. 4 (2) SER-fusiecode, which relates to procedure: in case of an 
unfriendly bid a written communication and invitation to negotiate within 7 
days of its receipt is required; See also Art. 6 (1) (c) in conjunction to 
this requirement;
148. See Art. 21 SER-fusiecode? Cf. BLOEMARTS, supra note 144, p. 56;
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rather effective: The VEH can instruct its members not to par­
ticipate in the realization of the bid by the offeror; and the 
offeror cannot realize his bid without the assistance of stock-
149brokers (members of the VEH)!
The rights of the Boards of Workers' Representatives are of a 
more limited character. The Act on Boards of Workers' 
Representatives (further: WOR) relates to the internal decision­
making process of the concerned enterprises; The bidder is under
a duty to ask the advice of the Workers' Board on his intention to 
make a bid.150 The target Board is not required to ask its Board 
of Workers' Representatives for advice, since they have no inten­
tion to merge voluntarily.151 One may be able to deduce from the 
scope of the law that when the target Board must consult its
Workers' Representatives if it were planning to advise positively
152 ^on the bidder's offer , there would be no reason not to require 
this if the target Board would want to advise against the bid.
Arguing that employees must be able to influence the decision­
making, Bloemarts pleads for a scale of defensive tactics in order 
to enforce the bargaining position of the target's Board of
149. See: BAKELS, OPHEIKENS, "Schets van het Nederlandse Arbeidsrecht",
Deventer (1986), p 154;
150.. Art. 25 (1) (b) WOR: since it is a decision on "financial par­
ticipation (controlling stake) in another enterprise";
151. Cf. ART. 25 (1) (a) WOR. According to UNI KEN VENEMA, supra note 144,
p. 369, this would be different when a bid would be made after a situation 
of "durable cooperation";
152. Cf. hitherto Art. 9 (2) SER-fusiecode;
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Directors.153 The converse, however, may hold true: the fact that 
defensive tactics are rusted in the system, may enable the the 
target to take a stronger stand against a takeover bid. At any 
rate, the rationale, offered for defensive tactics in Anglo-
American countries, i.e. defending shareholders' interests, thus 
becomes something else in the Netherlands. Bloemarts' thesis is
based on the premise that in case of an unfriendly takeover bid, 
the interest of the enterprise (and its employees) is subordinated 
to shareholders' interests. The legal rules and, more impor­
tantly, defensive tactics, consequently allow employees in the 
Netherlands to play a more active role in a takeover (although it 
must be added that the final decision remains with the 
shareholders). Thus defensive tactics might protect national 
employment.
Nevertheless, Bloemarts wants to go further: he defends more
extensive, explicit rights for employees and a longer period of
consultation, which would enable the target Board better to 
deliberate with, inter alia, its workers. An elaboration of these 
extensive and explicit rights would prove to be very useful, but 
the argument for extending the consultation period is double- 
edged: what is the use of this further step, but to lessen the
heat of a hectic takeover procedure?
153. BLOEMARTS, supra note 144, p. 57;
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4. REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS IN THE USA
4.1. Unfriendly takeovers in the USA
On the one hand, the US have been traditionally a country, where
takeovers were facilitated by the law, business practice and even
public opinion. On the other hand, aversion to unfriendly
takeovers has grown any time there have been takeover waves. As
154one American put it:
"there has thus far been no economic, political or legal consensus (...) 
as to whether hostile corporate takeovers (...) are good, and therefore 
should be facilitated, or are bad, and therefore should be able to be 
strongly resisted or even prevented by a board of directors."
Meanwhile, 1988 has beer, a record year for the takeover industry 
in Wall Street. 3.310 takeovers succeeded, of which 30.3 percent 
were unfriendly (as against 24.8 percent of the total in 1987). 
The sum of money involved in these takeovers (in 1988) was 282.4 
billion dollars, the highest amount ever.
In 1988, 325 foreign corporations acquired American corporations 
for a total amount of 54.8 billion dollars, which is an increase 
of 30 percent in comparison with 1987, when 45.3 billion was spent 
by foreigners. Biggest investors are the British (20.7 billion
154. LANDAU, "The federal and state roles in regulating United States 
business corporations", in: SYMPOSIUM Katholieke Universiteit van Brabant, 
Harmonisatie van vennootschaps- en effectenrecht: ervaringen en vooruit -
zichten in Europa en de Verenigde Staten, Deventer (1988);
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dollar in 1988), followed by the Japanese (10.4 billion dollar; an 
increase of 1,000 percent in comparison with 1987!) and the Cana­
dians (9.9 billion dollars).155
In looking at the US more closely the question that should be 
kept in mind constantly is; who would be the best suited decision­
maker on a presumed national interest in case of an unfriendly 
takeover from a foreign bidder? But this foreign bidder within a 
federal state also may be an out-of-state bidder, that is to say 
when for example a corporation in Delaware launches a bid for a 
corporation in Illinois.
American regulation, like its British counterparts, focuses 
largely on procedure and leaves little space for the consideration 
of other interests, than those of shareholders. The question 
whether these interests otherwise are accounted for will be dealt 
with below.
4.2. US Law regarding takeovers
4.2.1. The Federal legislator
In 1968, tender offers were first regulated at a federal level 
by the Williams Act, applicable to tender offers for securities of
155. Source: IDD Information Services Inc., January 4th. 1989, Reuter News,
in: NRC/Handelsblad, January 5th 1989, p. 7;
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companies registered with the SEC under the Securities and Exchan­
ge Act of 1934. The Williams Act added Sections 13 (d), (e), and 
14 (d), (e), (f) to the Securities Act.156 Prior to the enactment 
of the Williams Act a bidder could make a bid, without informing 
any party about its purposes. Perhaps due of the absence of 
regulation, the 1960's saw some rather nasty examples of surprise
15 7company raiding.
158One of the basic motivations for the Williams Act was:
"(...) full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors and to 
permit both the (...) cffer[or] and the management of the [target]com- 
pany (...) an equal opportunity to fairly present their positions."
In short, the Act caused bidders to bear risks that before could
be allocated to target shareholders, but the bidders still main-
159tained considerable discretion in structuring acquisitions.
The disclosure requirements are to be found in Sections 13 (a)f 
requiring information (prior to the bid) to be filed within 10 
days of acquisition of 5 % or more of a company's shares, and 14 
(d), requiring information contemporaneous to the announcement of
156. See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 781; 78 m (d)-(e), 78 n (d)-(f); DIETRICH, Die
Tender Offer im Bundesrecht der Vereinigten Staaten, Berlin (1977), pp. 353- 
357, for text of these provisions; see for recent tender offer reform,
inter alia reducing the filing period requirement, GOELZER, MILLS, GRESHAM, 
SULLIVAN, "The Role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in
Transnational Acquisitions'1, 22 Intl. Lawy. 615 (1988), p. 628-630;
157. DIETRICH, ibid., p. 127;
158. Introductory Note to proposed Regulation 14 D, in: BRUDNEY & CHIREL-
STEIN, Corporate Finance Cases & Materials, Mineola NY (1979), p. 729;
159. E.g. conditioning the realization of a bid on the amount of shares
tendered, or on the availability of financing for the transaction, DEMOTT, 
supra note 117, p. 405;
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the bid. Basically, they include number of shares owned, identity 
of the owner, purpose of the acquisition and source and amount of 
funds.160 Regarding Sec. 13 (d) it should be noted that current 
rules allow the acquirer to buy as many additional shares as he 
can in the 10 day window between the time the 5 % filing barrier 
is reached and the time of the filing.161 Sec. 14 (d)162 also
requires the offer to be kept open for a specified minimum period 
(currently fixed at 20 days). Further, if the bid is partial, 
i.e. for less than all of the target's shares-, it may not be on a 
first come first served basis, instead the bidder should accept 
shares that oversubscribe the offer on a pro rata basis.163 The 
Williams Act contains no provisions that large acquisitions should
160. 17 C.F.R. Sec. 24?, 13d-102, 14d-3 ( 19 87 )/Schedules 13 D and 14 D?
Both must be delivered to the SEC and 14 D to target shareholders as well;
161. This rule allows buyers to acquire shares that average 13,9 % of the 
target firm, according to JENSEN, "Takeovers: their causes and consequences" 
in: VARIAN, SHLEIFER, VISHNY (ET. AL.), "Symposium on Takeovers", 2 Journ. 
of Econ. Persp. 21 (1988), p* 44;
162. 17 C.F.R. Sec. 240.14d-3 (1987);
Disclosure under Schedule 14D-1 covers the following matters: 1) Info about 
the offer, including expiry date, offering price, withdrawal rights,
proration; 2) trading history of the security; 3) Info about the offeror and 
its officers, directors, partners, controlling persons, including employment 
histories and involvement in violations of securities laws; 4) Past 
contracts, transactions and negotiations with the target; 5) Source and 
amount of funds or other considerations used in the offer; 6) Purpose of the 
offer and plans of the offeror after acquiring securities to effect 
extraordinary corporate transactions; 7) Holdings of the offeror and its 
principals in that company; transactions in the target company's securities 
in last sixty days; 8) Terms of any contracts, understandings, or
relationships with respect to the target's securities; 9) Persons the
offeror has retained to assist the offer; [10) In case of exchange offer:
financial information about the offeror;]
163. 17 C.F.R. Sec. 240.14d-5, 14d-7 (1987); Cf. TAKEOVER BID PROPOSAL,
infra pp. 69ff;
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be made by general offer, but as soon as a tender offer has been 
announced, regular market purchases by the bidder are no longer 
allowed. Sec. 13 (e) and 14 (e) authorize SEC to make rules to
prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative practices in connec­
tion with purchases of its own stock by the issuer and statements
by the bidder of material facts required by the disclosure rules 
164respectively. Finally, Sec. 14 (f) foresees disclosure by the
target when adding persons to its Board of Directors, if faced 
with a (potential) bid.165 The provisions of the Williams Act 
apply to a foreign takeover attempt of a US corporation. They do 
not apply when a US corporation offers for the shares of a non­
listed foreign corporation. However, when a foreign entity is 
engaging in a takeover of another entity the Williams Act might
According to data assembled by Romano, in the period 1963-1987 
more than 200 bills were introduced in Congress with relation to
167corporate takeovers. Interestingly, no less than 49 of these
164. 17 C.F.R. Sec. 240.13e-4, 14e-2 (1987); See: FREY, CHOPER, LEECH,
MORRIS, supra note ?, p. 1241, SEC is allowed to na^e rules "in public
interest or for the protection of investors’*;
165. 17 C.F.R. Sec. 240.14f-2 (1987); Other provisions (relating to fraud) 
are to be found in 17 C.F.R. Sec. 240 . lOb-5,13,16 (1927);
166. This will depend on the extent to which conduct: takes place in, or
affects, the US and US investors, this was considered by a Delaware Court in 
Plessey Co. PLC v. General Electric Co. PLC, 628 F.Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986 );
relating to non-US bidders who do not use the US mail cr interstate
commerce, in the takeover process;
167* ROMANO, "The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public
Opinion", Working Paper # 86, Yale Law School, unpublished (1988), pp. 16- 
17/table 2; she excluded bills directed exclusively at acquisitions of 
banks;
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(of which 5 were introduced in 1987) were concerned with regula­
tion of stock and asset acquisitions by foreigners. Romano as­
serts that (most of) these bills may just have been motivated by 
xenophobic feelings unrelated to efforts at regulating takeovers,
since they are most often introduced to stop an unfriendly foreign
168takeover in progress. The recently enacted Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, in which the bill for a "Hostile
16 9Foreign Takeover Moratorium Act" was combined by conference, 
contains some provisions relating to foreign takeovers of US 
companies.170 It enables the President of the US to block certain 
takeovers on national security grounds171 , on recommendation of 
CFIUS. This section, also known as the Exon-Florio provision 
(after its authors), is somewhat broader than the previous autho­
rity of CFIUS; before, the ccrnnittee was able just zc review "the 
investments in the United States which, in judgment of the com­
mittee, might have major implications for the United States' 
national interests", but it had no power to block a proposed 
transaction, even if it determined the deal could harm US national
168. ROMANC, id., pp. 27-28; Romano shows an iteresting correlation between 
actual takeover threats by foreign (i.e. Canadian) acquirers and the 
introduction at a federal level of bills sponsored by senators of the 
affected states;
169. 133 Cong. Rec. S7073 (1987); This proposal was to impose a six-month 
moratorium on unfriendly tender offers by foreign entities if the consider­
ation offered was to be financed by debt, GOELZER, MILLS, GRESHAM, SULLIVAN, 
supra note 63, p. 630; The proposal was not added to my knowledge;
170. See: FT 25/1/89, p. 3;
171. Previously, the administration had powers to block foreign takeovers of 
television stations and nuclear power plants and the president could stop a 
takeover if it violated antitrust laws or in case of a national emergency;
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interests. So, at least the current rule establishes a block­
ing authority by the US president (on advice of CFIUS) when a 
strategic interest is at stake. It remains to be seen, how broad­
ly this provision will be interpreted. Although Congress tried to 
include the additional ground of adverse effects on 'essential 
commerce' this proposal did not make the final version of the
17 3Omnibus Act.
172
Whereas opinions of learned American authors differ from being 
moderately against, to strongly in favor of, takeovers, it is 
likely that the Democratic majority in Congress will extend 
screening of this activity. Senator Proxmire* recently stated 
that he sees an important role for the federal government in 
regulating takeovers, as he feels that strong competition and 
antitrust enforcement will encourage industrial efficiency mere
172. See THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS INC.r "Foreign Investment”, 6 Int. 
Trade Rep. 121 (1989);
173. The [modified] version was preferred to a proposal requiring foreigners
holding 5 % or more of any US property with assets of S 5 million or more to 
register with the commerce department; cf. Sec. 13 (d) Williams Act, which 
applies to domestic and foreign investors, Statement of J. Grundfest 
Commissioner of the SEC, May 8, 1986, in GOELZER, MILLS, GRESHAM, SULLIVAN,
supra note 63, p. 631; Note however, that the 5 % disclosure bill, also
known as the Bryant Bill, is likely tc pass through Congress again this 
year. Under the new HR 5, there would be restricted access to such
information to authorized persons in the Commerce Department and General
Accounting Office, designated state agencies, congressional committees and 
subcommittees, and researchers approved by the secretary of commerce;
174. Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin, SYMPOSIUM (COFFEE, DAVIS, MACEY, PROX- 
MIRE ET. AL.),"What’s right and wrong about Hostile Takeovers ?", in: Wise.
L . Rev. 353ff (1988);
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than 'merger mania’.175
4.2.2. Court decisions
There are two important Supreme Court decisions dealing with the 
federalism value, where takeover regulation was considered as a 
fundamental aspect of corporate governance and therefore tradi­
tionally an area of state corporate law regulation. In Edgar v. 
MITE176 , the US Supreme Court struck down an Illinois first gener­
ation tender offer statute on Commerce Clause grounds. The sta­
tute subjected all bids for Illinois companies with substantial 
assets to notification and registration with the Illinois Secre­
tary of State. The definition of an Illinois company applied zc 
any company, of which 10 % or more of the stock was held by an 
Illinois shareholder (or if other conditions were met).1,7 The 
concurring judges considered the statute invalid because it in­
stituted a direct restriction on interstate commerce and because 
its local benefits were outweighed by the burdens it imposed on
175. He states inter alia: "Contests for corporate control bear on the
national economy" (...) and: "The fact is that goverment cannot, and should 
not, stand by and let these so-called 'free market' forces work their will." 
PROXMIRE, SYMPOSIUM, ibid., p. 36 3;
176. 457 U.S 624 (1982); also JENNINGS, BUXBAUM, Securities Regulation -
Cases and Materials, 5th ed., St. Paul (1987);
177. See: COFFEE, "Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: a critical
assessment of the Tender Offer's role in Corporate Governance", 84 Col. L. 
Rev. 1145 (1984), p. 1268;
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interstate commerce. In this case, the Court seemed to place
the nationwide securities market beyond the regulatory reach of
17 9individual states. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
the Supreme Court offered a rather different perspective on take­
overs and their regulation, when it abandoned the protected status
18Gof takeovers under federal law. After asking itself the ques­
tion, whether the invoked second generation Indiana statute 
(that barred bidders from acquiring control of target companies
unless target shareholders affirmatively voted to transfer such
181control ) stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu­
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, the Court 
upheld it against both Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause chal­
lenges • In this case, the Court found that there was no uncon­
stitutional regulation involved, as the Indiana statute allowed a 
bidder to acquire the shares without hindrance. However, the CTS
178
178. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., supra note 176, pp. 640-646: Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Stevens and O'Connor: Justice Powell concurred
only on the last ground; Cf. Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., infra p. 83, note
223;
179. See BUXBAUM,HOPT, supra note 15, noting that although they might be
dressed in securities regulation poiicy of 'full disclosure', enlightened 
laissez-faire principles still might exist and be appropriate in the field 
of takeovers; Also: COFFEE, supra note 177, that it was unlikely the Court 
would be persuaded by appeals to federalism in this context, but see CTS !;
180. 481 U.S. 69 (1987); See for an extensive treatise on this case: LANGE-
VOORT, "The Supreme Court and the politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment 
on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America", 101 Harv. L. Rev. 96 (1987);
181. The practical effect of this statute was to prevent tender offerors 
from assuming immediate control of tendered shares; it was unlike the 
Illinois statute of MITE, in that it was styled purely as a corporate law 
provision applicable only to firms incorporated in Indiana, and that it 
vested all power on target shareholders, LANGEVOORT, ibid., pp. 97-98;
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decision provided a net contrast to MITE by the former's skep-
182ticism about the virtues of tender offers. In his comment on
CTS, Langevoort concludes that the real interest of the Indiana 
statute was the protection of local businesses from the rigors of 
the interstate market for corporate control by claiming sharehold-
18 3ers interests. The latest development, third generation take­
over statutes, is likely to be screened in the near future by the 
Supreme Court. Recently, a Wisconsin statute has been challenged 
under both Supremacy and Commerce Clause in a US Court of
184Appeals. This statute postpones post offer transactions (often
the reason to make the bid), unless the target’s board has agreed
185with the transaction in advance. As it does not attempt to
regulate the bidding process, and as it is neutral between
182. Justice Powell: "There is no reason to assume that the type of
conglomerate corporation that may result from repetitive takeovers is (...) 
more management efficient or otherwise beneficial to shareholders." 481
U.S. 69/ p. 83 note 13;
183. This conclusion was drawn from the following facts: the Indiana Law of
Corporations presumably applied to all corporations chartered there. The 
statute in question however, only applied to 1) Indiana businesses with
principal office or substantial assets in Indiana and 2) a certain 
concentration of shareholders in Indiana. So protection of shareholders
(the predicate for the statute's validity) was doubtful, because it denied 
'protection' to shareholders of Indiana corporations when principal
activities and assets of a firm happened to be elsewhere, LANGEVOORT, supra 
note 180, pp. 106-107;
184. Amanda Acquisition Corporation v. Universal Foods Corporation, et. al.,
US Court of Appeals, 7th Cir., Nos. 89-1581, 89-1712, May 24 1989, 1341 Fed, 
Sec. L. Rep, 92811 (6-7-89);
185. The bidder must wait three years after buying the shares to merge with
the target or acquire more than 5 % of its assets, 1341 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
92811;
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interstate/intrastate commerce (regulation of internal affairs of
• 186 Wisconsin corporations) the statute has been upheld.
MITE and CTS dealt more with takeover regulation as such, where 
the making of corporate law historically had been the prerogative 
of the chartering state, except in unusual circumstances. The 
Court reasoned from the assumption, that corporate law is neces­
sarily extraterritorial in its impact.187
However, courts also engage in screening defensive measures by 
incumbent managers/directors. Here, the central question would be 
the extent to which the courts will defer to the decision of the
corporation's managers, as an exercise of their discretionary
188business judgment , to defend against an actual or prospective
189takeover bid. It is important here to realize the difference:
tactics to thwart an actual bid (ex pest) will mostly be employed 
without shareholders' consent. Whereas ex ante tacticsf which
186. It is noteworthy that the US Court of Appeals strongly rejects the 
Wisconsin State Law and anti-takeover state legislation as a whole# as 
stated by Judge Easterbrook in his opinion, 1341 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 92812, 
92819;
187. LANGEVOORT/ supra note 180, p. 104;
188. The business judgment rule presumes that a director acts in good faith 
when making business decisions, Smith v. van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 
1985), p. 873. Good faith consists of two elements here: 1) a director must 
take action with honest belief that such action is in the best interest of 
the corporation, 2) a director must make decisions for rational business 
purposes;
189. JOHNSON, SIEGEL, "Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target
Directors", 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 315 (1987) suggest replacement of the busi­
ness judgment rule by the fairness test, because of the inherent conflict of 
interest for managers. EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL, supra note 5, reject the 
business judgment rule altogether in case of an unfriendly takeover, whereas 
JENSEN, supra note 161, p. 42 finds the whole rule obviously incorrect as a 
description of human behavior as it would be too altruistic;
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may be stated in advance are usually implemented with sharehol­
ders' approval, and of a more general nature. In Unocal Corp. v.
190Mesa Petroleum Co. , the Delaware Supreme Court held that the 
directors of a target corporation properly exercised sound busi­
ness judgment in responding to an unfriendly two-tier bid with a 
self tender by the target for its own shares that excluded the 
unfriendly bidder from participation.191 It acknowledged however, 
that the business judgment rule provided only weak monitoring of 
directors' loyalty and it transferred the initial burden of proof
192from the plaintiff to the target board. Johnson criticizes the
Unocal tests (demonstration of impediments to corporate policy and 
effectiveness; good faith; reasonable investigation;) as being 
superficial. the only substantive aspect is that the director 
fulfills his duty of care, which is easilv ~et bv cevctir.g ti~e 
and attention to making the decision. 19'i Later that year the same 
Court upheld a corporation's flip-in provisions, relating to 
rights triggered in the event of a tender offer for 30 % of the
190. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), analysed by JOHNSON, SIEGEL, ibid., p. 329ff; 
HERZEL, SHEPRO, "Ups and Downs of US Takeover Defense", 9 Comp. Lawy. 84 
(1988), p. 85;
191. Two-tier bids are bids involving a cash offer for the majority of the 
target's shares at a premium (the 'front end'), coupled with an announcement 
of the bidder's intent, if succesful, to acquire the remaining interests in 
the firm upon less favorable terms by merger ('back end'); these bids may 
give rise to a 'prisoner's dilemma', see: LOWENSTSIN, "Hostile Takeovers: A 
Remedy of First Resort or Last Resort?", 52 Rev. de la Banque 12 ( 1988 ); a 
self tender is made by a company in order to purchase its own shares, see: 
BRADLEY, ROSENZWEIG, supra note 11;
192. Cf. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc. 781 F.2d 264 (2 d.
Cir. 1986), in New York State the burden of proof has not been shifted;
193. JOHNSON, SIEGEL, supra note 189, p. 338;
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company's shares or actual acquisition of 20 % of its shares by
one single entity or group in Moran v. Household International 
194Inc. The Delaware Court ruled that the business judgment rule,
as construed in Unocal, also applied to director's adoption of a 
defensive tactic ex ante, i.e. to ward off future offers. In 
fact, the Court stated in Moran that ex ante tactics deserve 
greater protection than do ex post tactics, as the last are in­
stituted under pressure of a bid. Lack of pressure, the Court 
believed, would increase the likelihood chat directors would
exercise reasonable judgment.195 Finally, the Revlorf96 case
197states that lock-up options are not necessarily improper, but 
that the business judgment rule does not protect their adoption 
when breakup of the company appears to be inevitable. These three 
cases thus shew, zhaz although being subject to judicial review, 
directors in the US retain reasonable discretion when applying 
defensive tactics, either ex ante or ex post.
194. 500 A. 2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Flip-in provisions dilute the bidder's
holding and voting power in the target, by permitting rights holders, except 
the bidder, to purchase shares and/or debt of the issuer at a bargain price, 
prior to, or regardless of, a subsequent takeover; See: DAWSON, PENCE,
STONE, supra note 11;
195. Moran, ibid., p. 1350;
196. Am. Revlon, Inc. v. Mac Andrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A. 2d 173
(Del. 1986);
197. Options granted to a bidder at a favorable price on authorized but 
unissued shares, in some cases exercisable only if a rival bidder gains 
control of the target;
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4.2.3« The State Legislator
American corporations are incorporated under state law. Yet, 
the constitutionality of state legislation, also in the area of 
takeovers, is frequently being challenged under the Supremacy and 
Commerce Clauses of the US Constitution {we saw this in 4.2.2.). 
In almost every state, corporate statutes are of an 'enabling' 
nature; the elaboration is left to the discretion of the actors 
involved, namely the shareholders, although the Board of Directors 
is by no means to be excluded here.
Meanwhile, since the CTS decision, many states have adopted
19 8several 'fresh' anti-takeover statutes. Most takeover-related
bills trv to ~ake accuisitions mere difficult. The cuestion thaz 
most literature focuses upon, is not whether these statutes are in 
accordance with federal law, but whether they represent sound law 
making. Opinions on this matter vary largely. Professor Romano 
holds and proves that these state anti-takeover statutes are 
enacted at the behest of one powerful constituent; she rejects 
the feasability that they would have been supported by a broad 
coalition of various interest groups, such as labor or local
198. See also: Appendix, Second Generation Takeover Laws, in: SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 81, pp. 524ff; Cf. third generation statutes, such as in Wiscon­
sin, supra p. 37; SARGENT, "Do the Second-Generation Takeover Statutues Vio­
late the Commerce Clause?", 8 Corp. L. Rev. 3 (1985);
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interest. Romano uses complicated regression analyses to look
for support for both "coalition” and "powerful corporation" hypo­
theses. On the basis of specific research of the politics behind 
a Connecticut anti-takeover statute (enacted at the behest of the 
AETNA Life & Insurance Company) and anecdotal evidence from other 
states, she finds the second hypothesis more likely to influence 
anti-takeover legislation. The regression analyses include sta­
tistical analysis of the likelihood of a state to enact a takeover 
statute based on the existence of a variety of factors within the 
state, such as number of union members and domestically incor­
porated unfriendly bidders.
Macey argues that most states are particularly ill-suited to 
provide socially desirable takeover legislation because the par­
ties with the greatest stake ir. achieving efficient legal rules 
are systematically underrepresented in the political process. 
Both Romano and Macey concede, that the problem of takeovers 
should be addressed at the corporation's level rather than at a 
state level. However, in the latter part of the eighties, a 
persistent support for anti-takeover legislation across the states 
is to be found. Even Delaware, which is considered the most 
liberal of American incorporation's states, has enacted anti-
199
199. ROMANO, "The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes", 73 Va. L. Rev. 
Ill (1987);
200. MACEY, "State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, in: 
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 174, pp. 467ff?
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takeover statutes after CTS.
Opposed to Romano and Macey are Davis and Coffee. Davis analy­
ses some Wisconsin legislation to stress that Romano's findings 
are not necessarily the universal case. He then deals with three 
justifications of state takeover legislation: 1. protection of
target shareholders, 2. broader forms of market failure and 3. 
protection of non-shareholder constituencies. Davis concludes, 
that states have a legitimate interest in protecting local stake­
holders in the corporation against discriminating effects of a 
202takeover. It is this point that was made by Coffee as well.
In analyzing the justification for state regulation, he states
that takeovers would be more palatable if stakeholders' interests
203were taken into account as well. So, according to these
writers the only plausible case for state regulation is the need 
to protect local non-shareholder interests against wealth 
redistribution effects of takeovers.
But, state regulation as we saw is by no means uncontested. 
Besides, it is imperfect in that it is likely to concentrate upon
2 01
201. HERZEL, SHEPRO, supra note 190, p. 85;
202. DAVIS, "Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the 
States", in: SYMPOSIUM, supra note 174, pp. 491ff; Conclusion at p. 522;
203. COFFEE, "The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockhol­
ders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups", in: SYMPOSIUM, supra note 174, pp. 435ff; 
Interestingly he includes corporate management as a stakeholder and advances 
corporate directors as mediators between shareholders and stakeholders. In 
comparison with earlier work of his on the matter of takeovers, this conten­
tion to me seems to be contradictory. Just the market for corporate control 
would exclude the incumbent manager as a mediator...
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in-state issues and possible losses and ignore out-of-state gains. 
We will elaborate on this below.
4.3. A closer look at the role of Employees
To allow employees' interests to be taken into account requires 
a flexible approach in the US. As these interests are almost 
diametrically opposed to the shareholders' interests, it remains 
difficult to point out the proponents of a more social approach to 
takeover bids which goes beyond traditional shareholders' inter­
ests.
The idea of corporate social responsibility204 would justify
management discretion in preventing socially wasteful takeovers.
In Herald Co. v. Seawell205 it has even been established that
directors could have an obligation to consider the interests of
non-shareholder constituencies in making corporate decisions, even
at the expense of shareholders' interests. Perhaps the merits of
206this case were a-typical or it is too outdated, because it
204. As defined by ENGEL, "An Approach'- to Corporate Social Responsibility",
32 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1979), pp. 5-6: "the obligations and inclinations of 
(...) corporations organized for profit, voluntarily to pursue social ends 
that conflict with the presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit." 
205.. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F. 2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972);
206. DAVIS, supra note 202, p. 521: "While the court stated that the duties 
of the directors were three-fold -to the shareholders, to the employees and 
to the public, (...)- the fact that the discussion turned in part upon the 
relationship between a newspaper and the community it serves limits the 
opinion's applicability";
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still remains fairly difficult to find a hard-core proponent of
207this notion in American literature.
There is a difference between the effect of takeovers on employ­
ment, and the role of employees on the takeover stage. Let us 
take a closer look at the first issue. According to empirical
data, assembled by NBER, wages and employment of firms involved in
2 0 8takeovers on the whole actually increase. But, appearances can
be deceptive. Both Romano and Macey misuse the findings of this
report. Romano finds no empirical evidence of a systematic
greater job loss of acquired firms, than in absence of a take- 
209over. Macey even thinks that overall national employment
210remains unaffected. Both are wrong in this respect. Takeovers
have led to elimination of jobs, according to a Senate report. 
Actually, the creation of new jobs in recent years was largely due 
to small firms, who have made up for more than 80 % of new
207. Opponents on the other hand, such as GILSON, "A Structural Approach to 
Corporations: The Case against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers", 33 Stan.
L. Rev. 819 (1981), p. 863, argue that this would mean that management
should then have the unrestrained discretion to determine how much corporate 
capital should be devoted to purposes management deems socially justified. 
According to Gilson this is a political decision, not a corporate nor an
economic?
208. See: BROWN, MEDOFF, "The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor”, in:
AUERBACH ED., Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, NBER Project
Report, Chicago (1988);
209. ROMANO, supra note 167, p. 40;
210. MACEY, supra note 200, p. 479: besides this, he makes a rather bold
statement: Major national unions and other elements of organized labour in
the US are voicing opposition to state anti-takeover statutes, id. p. 478;
But, labour leaders have as a matter of fact criticized the effects of
unfriendly takeovers at a national level, see DAVIS, supra note 202, p. 498;
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jobs. These firms were not necessarily the target of
takeovers. The NBER report was limited to the research of ac­
quisitions between small firms. Although it found no job loss for 
those small firms, it must be taken into account then that this 
finding might have been offset by job creation before the bid, or 
job creation by other small firms. Moreover, since no large firms 
were investigated it remains difficult to make a statement about
overall employment. It is likely that acquisitions of those large
firms relatively will have an impact on employment which is 
greater than the impact the smaller ones would have. Besides, no
data on out-of-state acquisition of in-state firms were included
212m  the findings! The NBER research was restricted in other
ways: It only dealt with one state, namely Michigan; therefore,
no conclusions on national employment on the basis of this report 
are justified. Moreover, it did not apply to unfriendly takeovers 
in particular, rather to acquisitions in general; it also made a
distinction between three types of acquisitions: the most
relevant for our purposes being described as: "Firm A purchases 
firm B and (at least initially) absorbs (most of) firm B's workers
211
211. See: PROXMIRE, supra note 174, p. 360;
212. So, if Macey bases his conclusion on this report in that an in-state
effect might have been found, and while no research on effects on the
national employment has been conducted, his argument seems to be seriously 
flawed;
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Also, even with regard to this last group, none of the 
Fortune 500 firms were included in the research.214 Consequently, 
the use of this empirical material is of limited and restricted 
scope. More research on overall effects is necessary in order to 
make general statements.
An interesting finding regarding public opinion is presented by 
Romano: approximately 40 % of the public believes that employees
2 1 Sof an acquired firm will lose, either money or their job. The
concern of legislators, according to her, is then in accordance 
with the perception that takeovers reduce jobs.
Let us now look closer at the role of labor. Organized labor
has explicitly stated its concern on the impact of takeovers on
216workers. If one accepts the proposition that employees are
worse off, then Romano's data highlight a deficiency in the proce­
dures leading to legislation: in 25 % only of the 77 hearings
conducted in Congress in 1963-1987 on takeover-related bills, a
213
213. BROWN, MEDOFF, supra note 208, p. 11; And, the findings for this group 
were employment growth of 2 %, BCJT reduction of wages with 4 %; this is 
again ignored by Romano and Macey; surely, there is some effect on overall 
wealth?
214. See: Comment by Carliner, BROWN, MEDOFF, ibid., p. 27; It is just this 
cluster of corporations that has been playing the leading role in the take­
over play, PROXMIRE, supra note 174, p. 360;
215. ROMANO, supra note 167, table 10; this table contains data of six
polls: between 42 and 71 % of the interviewees in these polls in fact saw a
negative result for employees. According to Romano this perception can be 
explained by the "availability heuristic” problem, id. p. 40, sic;
216. BROWN, MEDOFF, supra note 208, pp. 9-10: "Workers and their unions have
a vital interest in the corporate takeover issue. Corporate mergers, 
takeovers (...) often have serious effects on jobs, wages and working
conditions.";
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union member was heard as a witness. A limited role for emplo­
yees in the making of takeover legislation does not necessarily 
mean that they actually play a limited role in takeovers general­
ly. Employees are not forced to stay behind the scenes. In 
applying the nexus of contract theory once more, Coffee sees an 
indication of employees joining the negotiations at the time of a
takeover. He finds a general movement towards employees seeking a
218greater role on the takeover stage. The example he uses con­
tains an ex post voicing of opinion by the labor factor. There
219are also the so-called Employee Stock Ownership Plans; these
amount to a possibility for employees to gain more influence ex 
ante. Although one might argue that those ESOP's have been crea­
ted as a defense, the employees as allies of management, it re­
mains to be seen whether this would always be -he case (see IWA 
above for instance). Yet another step further lies the conception 
of employee=shareholder: shares individually held by the emplo­
yees of the corporation. It is felt that this form of profit 
sharing would increase overall productivity of the US economy.220
217
217. ROMANO, supra note 167, table 5;
218. COFFEE, "Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web'*, in COFFEE EDS., supra note 18, pp. 112-113; in reaching this conclu­
sion he uses the 1985 Icahn and Texas Air Corp.'s quest for control for TWA 
as proof. The unions then chose for Icahn, in spite of the Board of Direct­
ors’ initial preference for Texas Air. In fact, the unions made large wage 
concessions; they presumably believed these would be less drastic than wage 
cuts and lay-offs they anticipated Texas Air would impose on them, if 
gaining control of TWA;
219. See ARANOW, EINHORN, supra note 11, pp. 197-199;
220. COFFEE, supra note 218, pp. 112-113;
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But for our purposes, the most important result of employees as 
shareholders is the enfranchisement of employees in corporate 
voting at the time of a takeover.
4.4. Public Interest: National/Local Interest
The attribution of roles under this heading poses one difficul­
ty: the actors are abstract, perhaps invisible, though by no
means impeded from exerting an influence on the whole. As we saw 
before, public interest objectives are those which would probably
be pursued by regulatory measures if they were not being promoted
221voluntarily. One good example of a public interest was presen­
ted by Justice Powell, in Edgar v. MITE:2^2
"Inevitably there are certain adverse consequences in terms of general
public interest when corporate headquarters are moved away from city and 
state."
Without explicitly stating so, Justice Poweii offers an insight 
into different sorts of a national public interest. He is refer­
ring to a local interest (city;state). Next to this interest, or 
rather: on a larger scale, there exists the national interest
(e.g. when headquarters would be moved to Japan). In a federal
221. See supra para. 2.1.;
222 . Edgar v. MITE Corp., supra note 176, p. 646 (Powell, J., concurring); 
See also the accompanying footnote, referring to employment, but also to 
loss of community benefits, such as charity paid by the corporation;
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state, there is a difference between a national (federal) and a
local (state) interest. The protection of local interests was
more or less legitimized in Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., where it
2 2 3was established that:
"Where the state regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local 
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce 
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
It is this concept, which many authors oppose, the strongest 
opponent being Macey. He thinks state laws are "extremely costly 
devices for providing job protection for inefficient top level 
managers of poorly run firms and for keeping jobs in particular 
regions at the expense of more productive workers in other
regions”.224 Romano is also opposed to what she conceives as
22 5special interest state regulation.
Do these opinions tell us something about national interests' 
opinions ? Takeover legislation was and is mostly motivated by 
the need to protect shareholders from the inability to mount a 
collective response to an unfriendly bid, and -much less so- the 
need to protect workers from losing their jobs. The regulatory 
national interest of protecting shareholders is not defensible: 
could they not be protected better by self-regulation, either in
223. Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 US 137 (1970), p. 142?
224. See MACEY, supra note 200, p. 471;
225. ROMANO, supra note 199; see also COFFEE, supra note 203, p. 437, he
provides an example of an opposite local interest: the New York Securities 
Industries' opposition to takeover-related legislation, in which labor’s 
support apparently was more visible;
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the form of SEC's regulations, or even self-help, the amendment of 
the articles of association? The protection of national employ­
ment on the other hand, would fall under national (industrial) 
policy and therefore amount to a national interest, in case of 
cross-state (and not left to the state of the target) or cross- 
border bids; in case of in-state bids it would thus be local. 
Whether this sort of interest can be advanced in a legally valid 
way will be answered more extensively in part 5 below. But, a 
remark should be made here regarding the authors opposed to local 
job protection. They should then be equally opposed to national 
job protection. The theory of takeovers is in line with the
general economic theory of international trade, with a flexibility
226of the labor factor. If national takeovers were favorable for
the national economy, as is maintained, would international take­
overs be equally favorable for the world economy and therefore 
lead to a global wealth increase? Unfortunately, things are more 
complicated, although as said before, Romano thinks foreigner 
takeover-related legislation might be motivated by just xenophobic
227perceptions.
The public interest in the national security is easier to per­
ceive. This has in fact been the motivation of some anti-takeover
226. See for an explanation on International Trade Theories e.g.: WINTERS,
International Economics, 3rd ed., London (1985); especially the theory of
comparative advantages and neo-classical trade theory, pp. 15ff;
227. See supra pp. 66-67, and notes 167-168;
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legislation. Probably, the public interest argument of stop­
ping takeovers on 'symbolic' grounds is not unknown in the US (we 
looked at a European example of such a presumed interest above in 
chapter 2). This type of legislation would likely be disguised.
We have now re-examined national interests set out in part 2 
under the public interest heading. A distinction is to be made 
between job protection as a local and as a national interest. 
This distinction would equally hold for protection of symbolic 
interests, on a state (local) or federal (national) level. As 
stated above, a local strategic interest in the US seems rather 
unlikely.
But, even where a public interest is clear, whether national or 
local, the question whether this should give rise to regulation is 
another one, to be dealt with as well in part 5 below.
4.5. Who is the most suited decisionmaker on National Interests?
The question posed here requires a normative judgment, and a 
distinction must be drawn among 1. decisions concerning which
228
228. See supra para. 4.2.1.; Recently this provision was first used by the 
US government to block temporarily the takeover of General Ceramics Inc., by 
a Japanese Chemicals producer. Among Ceramics' products were beryllium 
ceramics, used in electric circuits that can be the components of nuclear 
weapons, IHT 19/4/1989, p. 15;

87
national interests must be protected, and 2. decisions regarding 
the legitimacy of an invoked interest.
Let us first summarize some of the findings in this part on
rules/role correlation. In reality, much of the rulemaking in the
OS takes place at the state level, especially since the 1987 CTS
case. Nevertheless, Congress is also quite active in legislating
on the subject of takeovers, though perhaps on a more general 
229level. Finally, the SEC has no formal authority, but de facto
2 30it has some rulemaking power. Courts screen state laws on
federalism grounds.
As for the roles, interesting findings emerge. With regard to
231federal legislation, we can look once more to Romano's table 5.
In no less than 60 % of the takeover bill hearings, target manage­
ment was heard. This contrasts sharply with the percentage of 
witnesses representing the Stock Exchange (5 %), shareholders (3 % 
only) and labor (25 %, as said above). On top of this, table 5 
provides us with another clue: The extent to which regulators are
star actors on the takeover stage in reality is much larger in 
comparison with the role of corporate (and interest groups) ac­
tors, than one might expect: Federal government was heard in 81 %
229. See: ROMANO, supra notes 167 and 199;
230. Cf. in this context the statement made by David S. Ruder, chairman of 
the SEC, who advocated SEC authority to preempt state regulation of take­
overs before the US Congress, see: ROMANO, supra note 167, p. 4;
231. Ibid.;
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of the hearings, Members of Congress in 42 % and state or local 
government in 30 % of the cases. A prospective research could
combine these data with data on state regulation, because as set 
out above, perceptions with regard to this latter regulatory form 
seem to vary. All agree that management’s influence on the making 
of state anti-takeover regulation is paramount. But, where some 
writers find a broad coalition of promotors of the said regulation 
(management with labor, community), Romano thinks the danger of
such regulation is precisely that it is made with support of
2 32management of only one powerful corporation in that state. So
of the corporate actors, the role of management on a federal and
2 3 3state level is relatively largest. Although the shareholders'
position would look weakest (cf. the hearings %), we must not 
forget that at least they are far more powerful than employees in 
the takeover play. They control their shares! (the need for 
regulation arose here because, inter alia, market intransparence 
and impossibility of collective response, as we saw). Employees, 
on the whole play a passive role, and though this fact is being 
obviated by the statement that takeovers do not affect employment 
directly or completely, the empirical data hereto are unconvinc­
ing .
232. ROMANO, supra note 199;
233. In fact, Romano found that besides corporate management and business 
groups, on the state level the next most active promotor of regulation is 
the local bar association; their interest being profits from future 
litigation!, ROMANO, supra note 167, p. 6;
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As to national (public) interest, no empirical research has been 
conducted on this argument in the US as of yet, so we must be 
careful in assessing its impact on regulation.
We must also be careful in determining the best decisionmaker on 
which interests are national, and the decisionmaker on the legiti­
macy of a national interest. To start with the latter, the legit­
imacy question: the idea of a national interest of itself connotes 
a nationwide issue. It would therefore definitely not be smart to 
leave it to management's discretion, who might discover here yet 
another possibility to attract public opinion in order to stop an 
uncalled for (foreign) takeover. Nor are shareholders the sui­
table entity to be the protector of a national interest. Why 
should they care if 'their' corporation were to be taken over by a 
foreign bidder, if they would receive a maximum premium for their 
shares ? Employees may have a legitimate stake in the outcome of 
the bid, their role in steering this outcome seems negligable. 
They are somehow not able to emerge from behind the scenes and 
thus not the best prospective protectors of the abovementioned 
interests.
With relation to the question which actor should decide on what 
the national interests are we saw that the legislator at various 
levels plays a large role in the regulation of takeovers as it is. 
While the question of regulation is an open one, if the case for 
it is accepted, the nature of the national interest (it concerns
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the nation) means that the legislator should be the central actor 
in such regulation. Self-help is not appropriate, the definition 
of the national interest should lie with the legislator. The 
federal legislator, not the state legislator, is the most suited 
decisionmaker on the national interests that merit regulatory 
protection. This is most obvious in the case of a strategic 
interest, where the national security is involved. But also for 
the so-called symbolic interests or stakes this proposition would 
probably hold, namely where the national interest exists to 
respond to a market failure. To explain this, we have to take a 
closer look at economic theory of federalism. The symbolic and
stake interests stem from externalities produced by a foreign 
takeover.235 The externalities in this case are either loss of 
prestige (symbolic), or loss of jobs (stake). The foundation of 
the thesis that the national government should have actual 
decisionmaking power in these cases lies in the need of correction 
of these market failures. The national government is the most 
suited intervener, because the remedies to the externalities that 
affect the mentioned interests fall most closely within its com­
petence. After all, the federal legislator is the only actor that
234. Adapted from: ROMANO, ibid., pp. 9-16? Market failure: when resources
are allocated inefficiently because an activity produces externalities or 
when a commodity or service is a public good?
235. Externality: when the activity yields benefits or costs to individuals 
or firms other than the actor, and those third parties cannot be excluded 
from enjoying the benefits or bearing the costs, ROMANO, ibid., p. 10;
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would be accountable to all citizens, so if the externality af­
fects them all, or many, the federal actor should make the rules 
as to who has to bear the costs, or to whom accrue the benefits, 
that originate from the externality. Thus, for national interest 
cases federal rulemaking is to be preferred.236 It will be neces­
sary however, to take a clear stand on what these national inter­
est are since the problem of competitive regulation arises where 
those interests are seen as 'local'.
The actual judgment on the legitimacy of an invoked national 
interests at the time of a takeover should be left to an independ­
ent supra-state (federal) agency. Again it is clear why the 
corporate actors are not the suited decisionmakers. The direc­
tors are likely to abuse such an offered instrument and use it as 
an additional argument to thwart the unfriendly bid. The share­
holders are likely to ignore the interest. The employees are 
placed on a side-track. An independent agency (such as e.g. SEC), 
on the other hand, could see to it that defensive measures are not 
being misused by corporations, even though courts are able to 
engage in checking this, as well.
236. Cf. the Romano data, supra pp. 90ff, asserting the influence managers 
exert upon federal takeover legislation; this influence would then have to 
be restricted;
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5. MONITORING DEFINED NATIONAL INTERESTS
5.1» Divergent attitudes compared
It is perhaps not altogether justified to compare the Takeover 
bid Proposal with the Williams Act. As regards content the 
Proposal sometimes goes further than the Williams Act; e.g. the 
requirement of launching a full bid after having reached a certain 
threshold (compare this with the British City Code) or disclosure 
requirements relating to the opinion on the prospective takeovers 
of target directors. In the US, the federal executive has some 
power to block foreign takeovers on the ground of national inter­
est. In the EC it is left to the Member States to decide on 
national interests, and on the reciprocity issue; a single supra­
national policy with regard to national interests does not exist.
The Takeover bid Proposal will be a compromise directive. 
Community decisionmaking is still restrained by institutional 
voting mechanisms which allow Member States to exert a dispropor­
tionate influence on the factual contents of most legal instru­
ments in the EC. However, if this is the case the insertion of 
national interests grounds in the Proposal might prove to be 
accomplished in an easier way.
Both the Williams Act and the Takeover bid Proposal lay down a 
minimum standard of desired conduct with regard to corporate 
takeovers. As was demonstrated in the previous chapters, member
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states of both the American federation and the European Communi­
ties actively engage in regulating takeovers. The difference lies
in the corporate systems. It is not misplaced to view the US as 
• 237one uniform system, where takeovers occur on a nationwide
scale, albeit the center of gravity of activities in this respect 
lies within the various states in which the large firms are incor­
porated. Competition amongst the states exists in the field of 
takeover regulation, which sometimes highlights negative attitudes 
towards unfriendly takeovers in general and sometimes a liberal 
stance towards this market for corporate control.
The situation in the EC is completely different; it is not a 
matter of competing national systems but of largely differing 
national traditions in this respect. In the UK, takeovers are 
accepted as a form of corporate restructuring on at least the same 
scale as in the US. The regulatory instruments offer a flexible 
and effective scheme of reviewing takeovers. Takeover bids may be 
balanced with interests other than those involved in competition. 
In the Netherlands on the other hand, strong opposition towards 
the whole unfriendly takeover phenomenon has led to a firmly- 
embedded system of anti-takeover measures. Next to this, other 
interests, such as the interests of employees who are granted a 
larger role, are taken into account. This is done, as in the UK, 
by way of self-regulation, but relating to different issues.
237. American law equates the shareholders' interests with the enterprise 
interest (and the interests of society as a whole), see BUXBAUM, "Market 
Liberalization and Institutional Ownership, Comparative Reflection on 
Corporate Governance", Salzburg Seminar paper, not yet published (1989);
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The relevant point relates to whether the national regulations 
in the EC in the field of takeovers (with specific reference to 
the UK and the Netherlands in this thesis) are likely to be over­
ruled by Community action, when those regulations either infringe 
upon the rights of other Community nationals (including companies) 
or run counter to provisions of the Treaty of Rome. The only way 
to monitor such actions in the current configuration at Community 
level is through the decisions of the EC Court of Justice, since 
the Takeover bid Proposal does not propose another supra-national 
screening authority. Can the US federal system in this respect be 
transferred to the European constellation?
5.2. Takeover bids and Federalism
As was shown in paragraphs 4.2.1.-4.2.3., the regulation of 
takeover bids and related topics is an amalgam of federal and 
state law in the US.
From a constitutional viewpoint it is the dormant Commerce 
Clause, or more specifically, its interpretation by the Supreme
Court and the use made of it by Congress which serves to delimit
2 38states' competences to regulate takeover bids. With a proposal
238. As to the Commerce Clause, see BUXBAUM, HOPT, supra note 15, pp. 4G£f, 
the criterion being to what extent state regulation purports to regulate 
interstate commerce. Or from the opposite federal point of view: "After
all, the more that previously intrastate commerce is recharacterized as 
interstate commerce, the more frequent the occasion for challenging state 
involvement in the remaining space under the dormant Commerce Clause”, id., 
P* 42;
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for a (supra-national) directive existing in the EC, a connection 
arises. Does the Treaty of Rome override Member States' takeover 
statutes in the same way federal law overrides state law in the 
US?
Let us briefly return to Edgar v. MITE and CTS, and third gener-
2 39ation takeover statutes. The situation with regard to state
takeover statutes remains unresolved to a great extent, where 
third generation statutes now modify the dormant Commerce Clause 
or Supremacy question; these statutes might again be reversed by a 
possible future Supreme Court judgment. It is doubtful to what 
extent the competition between the federal legislature and state 
legislature on the one hand, and the screening of state legisla­
ture by the Supreme Court, in a federal light, on the other, 
contributes to legal security as to takeover regulation.240
The MITE case is relevant in this respect, since it involved the 
most explicit example of a state regulation, with effects outside 
the boundaries of that state.241 In fact, the Act, by virtue of 
its breadth, allowed the Illinois Secretary of State to block a 
nationwide tender offer.242 The Supreme Court was concerned
239. See supra, pp. 69ff.; as is most eloquently asserted in BUXBAUM, HOPT,
supra note 15, p. 47, within both a philosophy exists, that the Commerce
Clause be institutional rather than personal protection or economic philoso­
phy, what happens is that "...courts are involved in articulating policy 
which the legislature may confirm, modify or overrule."
240. See also ROMANO, supra note 167;
241. 457 U.S. 624, p. 641: "The Illinois Act (...) directly regulates
transactions which take place across state lines, even if wholly outside the 
state of Illinois."; See BUXBAUM, HOPT, supra note 15, p. 42, as to the 
occasions for challenging state involvement under the scope of the dormant
Commerce Clause;
242. 457 U.S. 624, p. 643; The Secretary of State was competent to call a 
hearing on certain aspects of the bid, after notification thereof in order 
to decide on its registration;

firstly with a possible clash of the Act with the Williams Act, 
and then went on to investigate the legislation under the Commerce 
Clause, on the basis of a two-part test:
(1) does the state statute regulate evenhandedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest and are its effects on interstate 
commerce only incidental?
(2) is the burden imposed on interstate commerce not excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits?243
The Court answered both questions in the negative. It is not 
useful here to speculate as to what the European Court of Justice 
would have decided in a similar case, a possible example being 
the decision in De Benedetti-Société Générale. Probably, the ECJ 
would not even have progressed to dealing with second question, as 
under its competences it will only test marginally whether Treaty 
provisions are met. If we compare the decision of the Belgian
2 4 4Court of Appeals in the De Benedetti example with the Unocal 
decision,245 which transferred the burden of proof with regard to 
business judgment relating to the use of defensive tactics to the 
directors of the target, an interesting finding emerges. The 
Belgian Court conceded in the former case that there are no 
limits, under Belgian law, on directors' discretion to use these 
tactics as long as they consider the enterprise interest. To 
allow the directors to consider this is perfectly legitimate; it
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243. See: VAN ROEYEN, "Annotation, Validity under Commerce Clause of Federal 
Constitution, of State Statutes regulating Securities Transactions - Federal 
Cases", 73 L. Ed 2d 1454 (1984); Cf. BUXBAUM, HOPT, supra note 15, p. 50;
244. Supra notes 46 and 47;
245 . Supra note 190;
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is one of the major differences in attitude between the European 
and American business cultures. The flaw lies in the determina­
tion of this consideration. In Unocal it was decided that a lack 
of pressure would increase the likelihood of reasonable judgment. 
In the De Benedetti case the decision to augment the capital was 
taken under the pressure of an unexpected takeover bid, during the 
course of one night! The Belgian Court found this capital in­
crease decision to be sound policy of La Générale and did not 
think the decision contravened any provisions of European Law. It 
was argued that the capital increase did contravene European Law. 
No competence currently exists to overrule such a decision of a 
national court on a European level.246
Corporate decisions relating to cross-border bids are thus not 
likely to be screened in the current configuration. This gap 
could be overcome by prospective regulation. The Takeover bid 
Proposal though, as it stands, actually offers the potential of 
exact comparable situations as in the American cases under con­
sideration: prior notification (to inter alia a national
supervisory authority) and registration, legislated from the 
federal (Community) level, and therefore not likely to be over­
ruled as running counter to European Law (and Integration). 
However, in the Benedetti-case, even if this constitutes a single
246 . Except the preliminary ruling ex Art. 177 EEC, which is not required in 
this instance and was not requested by the Brussels Court. Cf. also Art.
170 which could allow the Italian government to bring the matter before the 
Court of Justice arguing that Belgium had failed to fulfil a Treaty 
obligation;
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example, a decision was taken by the board which definitely con­
travened European Law. The Takeover bid Proposal does not offer a 
possibility of second opinion.
The definition as to where notification and registration of 
cross-border bids should take place is largely left to the in­
volved Member States. It is therefore very likely that Member 
States will compete for authority, by means of defining, when a 
takeover bid is to be considered for registration in that State. 
The national authorities of certain of these Member States might 
then impose stricter standards, depending upon the extent of 
national public opposition to the takeover phenomenon. Moreover, 
nowhere does there exist a prohibition on conducting national 
hearings to e.g. "adjucate the fairness of the offer"247 , or more 
likely, its compatibility in connection with national attitudes 
casu quo interests.
Of course in the US, in later cases, such as CTS, the Supreme 
Court did uphold state regulation against the Williams Act. It 
should not be forgotten, however, that the kind of regulation 
screened in that case solely involved intrastate commerce, and was 
not constructed so as to have the same sweeping extra-territorial 
effects as the Illinois Act (though some academics might argue 
that the Indiana Statute did the same under a different guise). 
The chances are that the Supreme Court, if asked to adjucate in 
the Amanda case, will uphold the Wisconsin Statute on the grounds
247. cf. 457 U.S. 624, p. 639;
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that there is no frustration of Williams Act objectives, and no 
more than an incidental effect upon interstate commerce.
Taking into account the role of a federal court, it is probably 
not the forum most suited to decide on whether a state, where it 
is regulating more than the internal affairs of a corporation, has 
a legitimate local public interest to uphold.248 This is not a 
question which relates to the federal issue and should thus be 
left to the discretion of an independent regulatory agency , as it 
is in this case, the example being the SEC, under compliance with 
federal rules/policies in this respect.
Whether a Commerce Clause analysis is equally applicable to the 
EC remains a vexed question: We are not dealing with a federal
2 49form, not even to a rudimentary degree. As was argued , the 
answer depends upon the degree to which persons affected by na­
tional legislation are able to claim that Treaty provisions are 
being violated (if not implemented by e.g. regulation). The 
jurisprudence with regard to direct applicability of Treaty
2 50  •provisions , coupled with a preemptive effect of directives 
against national regulations, even "to the extent that these would
2 51be incompatible with Community basic principles" only suggests 
federal competence within the European Court of Justice to the
248. See supra p. 95;
249. See BUXBAUM, HOPT, supra note 15, pp. 41ff; See also: EULE, "laying 
the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest", 91 Yale L. J. 425 (1982);
250. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administrâtie der Belas- 
tingen, E.C.R. 1 (1963);
251. Case 106/77, Simmenthal II, E.C.R. 629 (1978), p. 644; Cf. Case 815/79, 
Çremonini, E.C.R. 3583 (1980), p. 3607; See: TIMMERMANS, "Die Europäische 
Rechtsangleichung im Gesellschaftsrecht", 48 RabelsZ 1 (1984);
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extent that it may decide upon interstate commerce issues (free
252movement issues).
The constitutional basis for Community harmonization legislation 
in the field of company law is Art. 3 h EEC jointly with Art. 100. 
Art. 100 A could serve as the basis rather than of Art. 100, since 
the Takeover bid Proposal is mentioned in the Single Act; conse­
quently, a qualified majority would suffice to determine the text 
of the final directive.253 However, even if the Proposal in its 
current form harmonizes various national rules regarding dis­
closure in corporate takeovers it does not add to either negative 
integration or positive integration,254 simply since it does not 
provide for supra-national monitoring.
Within the federal regulatory scheme, the question has another 
dimension: the corporation's freedom to function in a national 
market has become a derivative right, dependent upon what the 
federal government decides about an appropriate legislative divi-
2 5 5sion between itself and the member states. This concept is
more difficult to transfer to the European scene, as the process 
is turned round from the American federal experience. Whereas in 
the US the federal government was -originally meant to be-
252. Cf. BUXBAUM, HOPT, supra note 15, p. 41;
253. Ibid., pp. 203ff ;
254. To be understood here respectively as removal of discrimination and the
formation and application of coordinated commom policies in order to fulfil 
economic and welfare objectives other than the removal of discrimination; 
see PINDER, "Positive integration and negative integration, some problems of 
economic union in the EEC", 24 W.T. 88 (1968); also EHLERMANN, "The Internal 
Market Following the Single European Act", 24 C.M.L.Rev. 361 (1987);
255. See: Ibid., p. 44; also: BUXBAUM, "Federalism and Company Law", 82
Mich. L. Rev. 1163 (1984) ;

delimitated by the American Constitution, the EC Commission is 
delimitated by existing national legislation: it is easier to
instigate regulation in the Community in fields where the Member 
States have not yet been actively legislating. It is not apparent 
which is the case with takeover bids; thus there may be barriers, 
where a strongly developed regulatory scheme exists for example in 
the British system, but for the rest the rules are scattered
hither and thither in the other Member States, and thus fewer
barriers may exist.
The other question in this context is, whether a directive is 
the right instrument for the regulation of takeover bids. 
Takeovers which may lead to a merger which might have anti­
competitive effects, are dealt with in the EC Merger-regulation.
3ecause stronger Community intervention seems to be required here. 
It must be kept in mind that even for legal harmonization, the 
directive being albeit the most appropriate instrument, the
Commission also has the power under Art. 235 EEC to enact régula-
256tions. Although utter prudence in determining which is the
best instrument is called for, the problems which beset the 
directive are not insignificant; a two-stage legislative proce­
dure, i.e. national enactment after acceptance on the Community 
level, and possible overly specific drafting.
The problem with the Takeover bid Proposal thus remains, whether 
meaningful harmonization will take place, when after the lowest
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256. Case 8/73, Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson, E.C.R. 897 
(1973), p. 907; See as to instruments of harmonization: ABELTSHAUSER/
PIPKORN, "Zur Entwicklung des Europäischen Gesellschafts- und Unternehmens- 
Rechts”, EUI Working Paper 85/167, Florence (1985);
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common denominator for disclosure has been enacted and its' obser­
vance is required, the elaboration and monitoring is left to the 
national authorities, however inherent such features are to the 
meaningful operation of the directive.
5.3. The need for a supra-national Supervisory Board
The essential shortcoming of the proposed EC directive is that 
it does not solve in any way the prospective raising of interests 
at the time of cross-border bids, which may be anchored in na­
tional law. This also happens in the US, as was demonstrated by
the emergence of a phenomenon similar to European national inter-
257ests of invoked state local interests. As Romano showed, there 
exists a good deal of state anti-takeover legislation, aimed at 
preventing (out-of-state) unfriendly bids. This legislation is 
enacted at the behest of one powerful constituent, directors. 
Both state legislation and directors' actions are screened by US 
Courts.258 In the former case the extent of the extra-territorial 
effect of the legislation under scrutiny is monitored at a federal 
level, and in addition the legitimacy of the invoked interest. 
This last issue should be left to the discretion of an independent 
supra-state agency, which will be possessed of a better developed 
expertise in that field. With regard to directors’ actions, 
these are tested under the business judgment rule. Directors
257. Supra pp. 75ff;
258. See supra para. 4.2.2.;

fulfil their duty of care by devoting time and attention to the 
making of the decision (to use a defensive tactic). This sort of 
screening could also be left to the same sort of independent 
agency, comprised of members representing various interest groups.
Nevertheless, American courts are able to engage in a more 
thorough screening of corporate takeovers, both on a federal and 
on a state level. The European Court of Justice does not possess 
clearly outlined competences with regard to screening Member 
States' anti-takeover legislation. The preemptive issue still is 
in flux. Moreover, a citizen may not sue a Member State before 
this Court for a failure to observe the Takeover bid Directive. 
Instead, the intricate route of trying to lobby at government 
level in the Member State of the bidder to file suit, must be 
followed. Next to the fact that the Communities do not possess 
adequate monitoring instruments, - and this is the point around 
which the issues under scrutiny in this thesis revolve the 
European Communities are currently in transition. If the Internal 
Market goal is to be reached by 1993 many obstacles must still be 
overcome. However, the goal of an Internal Market also is met by 
national(istic) opposition. The unfriendly takeover, if it in­
volves other issues than competition, offers an excellent 
opportunity for any regulatory or judicial body in a given Member 
State to allow the directors of a corporation to advance baseless 
arguments, when their corporation is faced with an unfriendly 
cross-border bid. This was demonstrated by the De Benedetti case. 
When advanced in such a manner, these points against the prospec­
tive interstate takeover only serve to protect the position of
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these directors, because they are not related to the underlying 
motivation for the bid, which is in fact to gain control and 
exploit the target's assets in a more efficient manner.
This is not to say that issues, which may be considered to be of 
national interest, do not play a role at the time of an unfriendly 
(or friendly for this matter) bid. Indeed, it was previously 
argued that these interests may exist and some suggestion was made 
as to their nature. Moreover, they are sometimes discounted in 
the legislation of Member States. These issues are likely to 
arise during the bidding stage, which is to say, before an actual 
merger decision takes place. However, they stand to be abused in 
the unfriendly takeover game, if their advancement is made depend­
ent upon the actions of corporate constituencies or national 
authorities. They do merit being taken into account by a neutral 
constituent.
It is at this point that the paradox of the Takeover bid 
Proposal, as it stands, emerges. If the goal of harmonization is 
to promote competition,259 and if it is introduced under the White 
Paper; if the social dimension of the Internal Market is to be 
taken into account, then why does the Proposal not solve the 
problem of a possible national abuse of interests other than 
competition to bolster inefficient national corporations? At the 
same time it leaves the screening of such interests entirely to 
the discretion of national authorities, which are even less likely 
than a Community institution to be neutral against the in-state
104
259. See supra note 1;

target and the out-of-state bidder. It is conceivable that such a 
policy will simply hamper the full realization of the Internal 
Market.
This thesis essentially purports to propose two matters:
- The possibility of the legitimate existence of certain national 
interests at the occurring of cross-border (unfriendly) takeovers 
ought to be recognized in a Community instrument, preferrably the 
Takeover bid Proposal. If this is not done a regulatory gap will 
emerge. Those takeovers involving interests which are not covered 
by the current Merger Control Proposal will be left out in the
cold. A reference to national interest may be made under Art. 13
260(d) or 13 (f) of the Takeover bid Proposal. The remainder of
the article ought to be amended to the extent that it leaves too 
much discretionary power to national authorities. Even if it is 
the case that it is accepted, that such an attitude is justified 
in the area of merger control, this does not entail that the same 
would hold true for national interests. As has been argued, they 
need to be defined at a supra-national level, either in the 
Takeover bid Proposal, or in the policy declarations of the 
Commission.
A suggestion as to what could constitute a national interest in 
case of an unfriendly cross-border bid was made in chapter 2.
105
260. Withdrawal because of: "(...) exceptional circumstances and with the
authorization of the supervisory authority, giving reasons, where the bid 
cannot be put into effect for reasons beyond the control of the parties to 
the bid";
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- Art. 6 of the Proposal, i.e. the monitoring provision, ought to 
be amended. A supra-national board could be instated, replacing 
the numerous national authorities. This board could be completely 
independent from Community institutions, or e.g. introduced by 
Commission delegation. It could be modelled on the British Take­
over Panel but with additional powers that now fall under the MMC. 
The Community Takeover Supervisory Board would be charged with 
both the screening of the technical requirements as introduced by 
the current Proposal (Art. 6 (2)), and in addition the screening 
of national interests advanced at the time of an unfriendly take­
over. In other words, it would have to decide whether such inter­
ests in casu may be invoked legitimately. The Supervisory Board 
should consist of takeover experts, who are chosen or appointed on 
a transnational basis and who represent various interest groups, 
such as the corporate actors and trade unions but also regulatory 
actors such as stock exchange members. In order that such a Board 
could function in an efficient and rapid manner the works should 
be delegated on a day-to-day basis to an executive committee, 
which should be allowed even to conduct an investigation of na­
tional interests possibly at stake at a certain takeover bid on 
its own initiative. The findings of the committee -to be reported 
to the Board- should then culminate into a binding recommendation 
with which both parties, but especially the bidder, should comply. 
If the Supervisory Board would advance a fair and balanced argu­
ment against the takeover taking place, e.g. because it would 
endanger national security, or -still more debatable- because it 
would endanger the employment in a given industrial sector, the
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parties to the bid should be informed that the takeover would not 
be allowed to proceed. The leverage of the Board would consist of 
being able to refuse to further register the bidder's filings.
If the abovementioned institution thus would be formalized on a 
Community level two purposes would be met:
a) A fair balancing of national interests with Community interests 
(this would be especially important if the case for concurrent 
jurisdiction in national interest were to be accepted), and
b) A supra-national self-regulatory scheme of screening interests 
of other constituencies than shareholders.
261The aim of equal protection of all parties would thus be 
achieved.
5.4. Conclusion
In this thesis, no plea is made as to whether unfriendly 
takeovers should be stimulated or prevented by European regula­
tion. It has only been argued that an equal standard is required 
with regard to the monitoring of unfriendly takeover bids involv­
ing different Member States. If no supra-national authority is 
competent to decide on the legitimation of national interests, the 
White Paper goal of restructuring the European corporate landscape
261. Which is advanced in the TAKEOVER BID PROPOSAL, see supra p. 33?
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will not *'H met an(^* clashes arising out of the dichotomy of argu­
ments ipHt?rent to unfriendly takeovers might lead to expensive 
litigatic" whic^ i-n turn will boil down to bad decision making.
Finally# nothing has been said as to whether the same would hold 
true for screening world-wide cross-border takeovers. A free
trade pr.if>onent would probably not allow the consideration of 
national interests at any stage; a strong proponent of national
sovereign* Y would probably oppose the installment of a supra­
national authority. However, this matter is less urgent since it
does not ¿rise the Internal Market context and will be left to 
further d >acussion.
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